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The Attitudes of Indonesian Islamic Religious Leaders toward COVID-19 Pandemic and Its Handling

Ahmad Munjin Nasih^{1*}, Achmad Sultoni¹, Titis Thoriquettyas¹, Khozin²

¹ Universitas Negeri Malang, Indonesia

² Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, Indonesia

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Abstract:

WHO has declared COVID-19 as a global pandemic that attacks 213 countries. Although extensive studies have been carried out on various topics of COVID-19, very little research has focused on exploring how the attitudes and contributions of religious leaders in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. To fill this void, the present study explores the attitudes of 175 Indonesian Islamic religious leaders towards COVID-19 and their responses to the government's policies. Islamic religious leaders were chosen from the two largest socio-religious organizations in Indonesia: *Nadhlatul Ulama* (NU) and *Muhammadiyah*. Data were obtained using a semi-structured questionnaire distributed through an online Google form. Furthermore, the data collected was analyzed using quantitative descriptive analysis. This study offers the research novelty related to the attitude of religious leaders in dealing with the COVID-19 either in organizational dimension or government policies. The results of this study indicate the existence of diverse attitudes among Indonesian Islamic religious leaders towards COVID-19. The religious leaders' responses were not always in line with the government policy and their organization in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic.

Keywords: Islamic religious leader, COVID-19, government policy.

印尼伊斯兰宗教领袖对新冠肺炎大流行及其处理的态度

摘要:

世卫组织已宣布新冠肺炎为袭击 213 个国家的全球大流行病。尽管已经对新冠肺炎的各种主题进行了广泛的研究，但很少有研究集中在探索宗教领袖在应对新冠肺炎大流行方面的态度和贡献上。为了填补这一空白，本研究探讨了 175 名印度尼西亚伊斯兰宗教领袖对新冠肺炎的态度以及他们对政府政策的反应。伊斯

Corresponding Author: Ahmad Munjin Nasih, Universitas Negeri Malang, Indonesia; email: munjin.nasih.fs@um.ac.id

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兰宗教领袖是从印度尼西亚最大的两个社会宗教组织中选出的：纳赫拉图尔·乌拉玛 (NU) 和穆罕默德迪亚。使用通过在线谷歌表格分发的半结构化问卷获得数据。此外，使用定量描述分析对收集的数据进行分析。这项研究提供了与宗教领袖在组织层面或政府政策方面处理新冠肺炎的态度有关的研究新颖性。这项研究的结果表明，印度尼西亚伊斯兰宗教领袖对新冠肺炎存在不同的态度。宗教领袖的反应并不总是符合政府政策及其组织应对新冠肺炎大流行的方式。

关键词：伊斯兰宗教领袖，新冠肺炎，政府政策。

1. Introduction

The spread of the COVID-19 virus by the World Health Organization (WHO) has been categorized as a pandemic that attacks 213 countries worldwide (World Health Organization, 2020). Globally, the COVID-19 virus is spreading rapidly. It is suspected that one of the media spread is through religious activities. Some examples of religious ceremonies related to its role as the epicenter of the COVID-19 spread are activities at the Shincheonji church, Daegu, South Korea (Hartley et al., 2020; Kang, 2020; Park et al., 2020), where 111 of its followers were confirmed positive for COVID-19; the case of the Evangelical church in Mulhouse, France (Crawford et al., 2020; Deshwal, 2020; Mogi & Spijker, 2020), which caused 2,500 people to be positive; and cases of the Tablighi Jama'ah at the Masjid Jamek Seri Petaling, Malaysia (Hasanat et al., 2020; Mohd Hanafiah & Wan, 2020; Salim et al., 2020), at the New Delhi Mosque, India (Jamwal et al., 2020; Singh & Adhikari, 2020; Singhal, 2020), in South Sulawesi and Jakarta, Indonesia (Park et al., 2020; Sirkeci & Yucesahin, 2020; Tosepu et al., 2020). Even in the case of Tablighi Jamaat in India and Indonesia, there was a conflict between government authorities and religious leaders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to acts of violence and boycotts.

In Indonesia, one of the pandemic-stricken countries recorded until February 9, 2021, the number of people infected with COVID-19 reached 1.16 million, with 31,556 deaths and 950,000 patients declared cured (Ministry of Health of Republic of Indonesia, 2021). One of the government policies to overcome the spread of COVID-19 that is enough attention is the implementation of physical distancing. The consequences of this policy are that the wheels of community life, starting from the economy, education, social religion, and others, will be disrupted. In the context of religion, the impact of the policy of physical restrictions on religious people may not carry out religious activities that involve many people, such as worship in mosques, churches, or temples. Instead, they worship from their homes. As followers of the majority religion in Indonesia, Muslims respond to this policy from various perspectives. Some of them accept some questions and even ignore the urgency of this policy.

Regarding religious leaders, in a study conducted by Hirokoshi, it is known that the existence of ulama is a source of social change, not only in the *pesantren* community but in the surrounding community (Abubakar & Hemay, 2020; Hardianto, 2019). Another

interesting study to review is research that shows the position of the ulama as a cultural broker, which seems to state that the influence of Kyai (another name for ulama) lies in the implementation of this broker function (Nasution, 2017). The function and role of brokers and scholars in the Covid-19 discourse can be interpreted as providing responses and considerations related to the pandemic.

This research is situated within the perspectives of 175 Indonesian religious leaders regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and its handling enacted by the Indonesian government. The article is written systematically in four sections. First, we elaborated on the background issues and raised the questions in the introduction section. Second, we discussed the relevant theoretical lens of literature reviews. Furthermore, we explained the design and how the data were gathered and analyzed in the method section. The next section deals with findings presented in the forms of percentages and descriptive statistics analysis. Lastly, the article discusses the findings in detail, relates them to the literature, and provides a clear-cut conclusion on the overall results of the research.

2. Method

This research uses quantitative methods. Data were collected from respondents using a semi-open questionnaire via Google Forms. The questionnaire consisted of 20 question items and was designed to obtain respondents' background, attitudes towards the Covid-19 pandemic and its handling, which included: respondents' profiles, insight of Covid-19 and resources, attitudes toward Covid-19, and responses to government and organizational policies in dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic. Except for the question related to the respondents' profiles, each question has four response options and one filling-in. The four options in some questions are "very positive," "positive," "neutral," and "negative." Meanwhile, options in other questions are descriptive information. Before being tested on respondents, the question items were validated through a Focus Discussion Group (FGD) involving relevant scientific experts. The 175 respondents were religious leaders from NU and Muhammadiyah and came from the islands of Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan.

The data collected was then analyzed using descriptive analysis based on the percentage of answers from each question item asked. In the analysis, the researchers first code the data and sort the responses

related to the two research focuses. Meanwhile, unrelated responses are matched and harmonized into a pooled data subset.

3. Findings

The initial part of the results of this study describes the profile of the respondents, amounting to 175 people. Based on gender, 77.1% were male, and 22.9% were female. Most respondents are educated. This is evident from their educational background: 88.6% are college alumni, with 34.3% of undergraduate and graduate alumni and 20% of Ph.D. alumni; 11.4% are high school and junior high school alumni. As for the affiliations, 52.6% (92 people) came from NU, and 47.4% (83 people) came from Muhammadiyah. The detailed profile of the respondents shows that most religious leaders from the NU and Muhammadiyah are well-educated, and the aspect of rationality will significantly influence their attitudes and views, both in perceiving COVID-19 and the policies taken by the government.

3.1. Attitudes toward Covid-19

In assessing the COVID-19 pandemic, most respondents see it from a theological perspective. 68.6% of the respondents view COVID-19 as a test from Allah to His servants, 5.7% consider it fate, and 4% consider it a doom (torture). Meanwhile, as many as 14% of respondents rate the COVID-19 pandemic politically, which is engineering by certain organizations or countries. Regarding the COVID-19 pandemic in Indonesia, most respondents showed an adult and religious attitude. 56.6% of the respondents felt calm in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, and 21.1% of the respondents felt normal. Meanwhile, only a few felt fear, which was 14.9%. Details of the respondent's attitude are illustrated in diagram 1 below.

Table 1. The respondents' attitudes toward COVID-19

Attitudes toward COVID-19	Calm	Usual	Afraid	Others
Total	99	37	26	8
Percentage	56.6%	21.1%	14.9%	7.4%

Out of the respondents' feelings, their actions in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic were dominated by praying and maintaining health (73%). The rest consists of protecting themselves as much as possible (9.2%), activities as usual (5.2%), surrendering to God (5.2%), and others (8%). Responding to the attitudes and actions of some Muslims who seemed to underestimate the COVID-19 pandemic by stating, "Fear God, not COVID-19. Keep praying at the mosque", the majority of respondents (52%) stated that it was a wrong attitude. However, 19.8% of the respondents tended to agree, 10.5% agreed, and 2.3% strongly supported this attitude.

Meanwhile, in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, most respondents stated that they contributed to preventing the COVID-19 spread by encouraging

people to pray and maintain health (50%) and comply with government policies (33.3%). The rest answered others (12.7%). In line with this data, many respondents stated that they conveyed the information they obtained about COVID-19 to the community with the following details: always (28%), sometimes (38.3%), if needed (32.6 %), and only 1.1% did not. Most reasons they share information about COVID-19 are humanitarian, namely caring for the safety of fellow humans (84.5%). However, a small portion of the respondents (12.1%) also deliver information to the community because they want to share information.

3.2. Compliance with the Organizations

In terms of compliance conducted by respondents in connection with corporate fatwa regarding the elimination of religious activities, it was found that most of the respondents followed the fatwa (69.7%), and 24.6% did not fully follow it. Complying with the religious organization fatwa is motivated by the belief that the fatwa has been comprehensively studied (62.9%), helps create conducive atmosphere (22.4%), and disseminates corporate fatwa (8.6%).

Other findings show that the respondents will reprimand and remind (68.6%) and leave (22.3%) when faced with the situation of their counterparts from one organization opposed to the fatwa of the parent organization. Regarding the attitude of the respondents when the religious suggestion/fatwa from the organization was contrary to government policy, it was found that the respondents would take the middle point between religious fatwa and government policy (42.3%), considering the situation and condition of the community (26.9%), following government policy (14.3%) and the organization's fatwa (13.7%).

3.3. Compliance with the Government Policy

In terms of compliance with government policy, most respondents considered it a prudent measure (48%) and reasonable (19.4%). Meanwhile, regarding government policy to exclude religious activities that gather large numbers of people as a form of physical distancing, some respondents rated the government policy as excessive (15.4%) and an expression of fear (9.7%). It is known that 73% of the respondents followed the government policy, and 24.1% did not fully follow it. The motive to follow government policies, namely respondents believe that the government has reviewed the policy thoroughly (53.8%), helps create a conducive atmosphere (19.9%) and forms of obligation as citizens (17.5%).

Meanwhile, most respondents obeyed the policy in response to the government's suggestion to worship at home. This is evident from the questionnaire data that 66.6% of the respondents worship at home, with 40.2% worshipping at home with family as usual and 26.4% worshipping at home, respecting physical distancing. However, 23% of the respondents said they continued to worship at the mosque by observing physical distancing, and 5.2% worshiped at the mosque/mosque

as usual. Regarding suggestions to avoid shaking hands in religious activities, many respondents obeyed these recommendations. Respondents answered that they suggested not shaking hands (58.3%), avoiding shaking hands (18.3%), waiting for other people's calls to shake hands (8%), and others (15.4%).

4. Discussion

The findings section presents the diverse perspectives of religious leaders from NU and *Muhammadiyah* regarding COVID-19 and their response to the *fatwa* from the parent organization and government policy. In terms of attitude, these religious leaders actively update information about Covid-19 on social media and often share it with the public. This attitude is categorized as a positive and responsive attitude. Sharing knowledge on social media has been considered appropriate and quick access for many people.

Religious leaders shared COVID-19 information with the community because of humanitarian considerations. This is in line with research conducted by Ghaisani et al. (2017), who argue that sharing information on social media, following the interests of its users, in this case, is a human-to-human relationship. Previously, Osatuyi (2013) found that the credibility of information sharing was visible from information sources that were generally trusted by the public. Therefore, the religious leaders in this study shared credible information they had encountered in human relations (Oh & Syn, 2015). However, our study also portrays inconsistencies between the views of religious leaders and government policy. This is estimated to result in the imposition of these government policies that are not optimal, seen from their perception that COVID-19 is a test from God. Previous studies have shown that this belief is influenced by the high level of Indonesian religiosity (Lucchetti et al., 2016). This value is considered a factor that contributes to their level of happiness, which leads to better health in some cases (Amalia et al., 2016).

Besides illustrating the knowledge of religious leaders about Covid-19, this study also portrays opposite religious attitudes of NU and *Muhammadiyah* figures in the region and their parent organizations. According to Bourdieu, the field of religious studies is a competitive arena that allows individual groups of people to try to produce, acquire, and control religious models, capital, and symbols to legitimately be offered to ordinary people (Wilterdink, 2017). For NU, the tradition of religious dissent is understandable. Because at all levels of NU management, from the center to the regions, *Bahtsul Masail* institutions (institutions that study NU's unique religious decisions) can issue religious decisions independently. Even religious decisions issued by the parent organization do not necessarily bind NU members or administrators below the level (Arifianto, 2021).

In contrast to NU, for *Muhammadiyah*, this

difference in religious attitudes became something unusual. Some even called it "insubordination." This is because Muhammadiyah has only had *Majlis Tarjih* (an institution that studies Muhammadiyah's unique religious decisions) (Anshori & Muhammad, 2020; Burhani & Ahmad, 2019). Concerning government policy, counterproductive actions can be seen from the attitude of religious leaders. They prefer to put the community's interests first by looking at the development of the situation and conditions (26.9%) rather than complying with government policy (14.3%). They will even take a middle ground between organizational decisions and government policies (42.3%). This is interesting because, as Islamic religious leaders in Indonesia, they do not fully have conflicting beliefs and thus, for some conditions, can conflict with what the government is doing (Hamayotsu, 2013; Hefner, 2000). This informs that their role in society is crucial for the government to help the success of policy implementation (Riddell, 2002).

In interpreting the above respondents' data, the researchers revealed that religious leaders have social capital due to their position and people's trust in their knowledge (Andriani & Christoforou, 2016). The power relation played by religious leaders gives room to interpret and disseminate information that develops in the community. The modalities of religious leaders in the form of cultural capital (cultural capital), economy (economy capital), social (social capital), and even religious capital (religious capital) (Atkinson, 2016; Harker et al., 2016; Robbins, 2020), increasingly crystallize the authoritarianism of the decision or understanding it conveys. The concept of the religious authority referred to in this analysis borrows Max Weber's theory explained by Zulkifli (2013) that religious authority is "a quality of an individual personality by which they are set apart from ordinary people, treated as endowed with the supernatural, superhuman, or, at least, exceptional qualities." Furthermore, Zulkifli (2013) emphasized that the concept of authority is not opposed to the concept of power, and both have their own domains.

From the above explanation, it can be concluded that there is a fundamental difference between "power" and "authority." Power or power is more in the capacity to respond to a social phenomenon, whereas authority is only limited to the authority to act, lead and decide. Therefore, in this case, authority becomes very fluid and does not rigidly belong only to one particular community. Any group and group can appear in front of the public to present ideas. According to the findings above, habitual patterns built by religious leaders also contribute to religious construction related to diverse perspectives and give rise to inconsistent responses. Viewed from the perspective of adherence to religious organizations, the data found in the field shows that respondents have a high enough preference (69.7%) to comply with the *fatwa* given by religious leaders. This shows that the social capital of religious leaders who

have been established and built in the community plays quite a dominant role. However, the contradiction is seen in the attitude of respondents who think that the motive to obey religious fatwa is the desire to participate in socializing religious fatwa (8.6%), which is quantitatively very small.

This proves that the respondents' dualism arises in patterns, attitudes, and compliance backgrounds in their preference for religious organizations, even though religious leaders have considerable social, cultural, and political capital. Researchers believe that religious leaders do not optimize the dimensions of habitus and intersectionality between individuals in the arena space (social environment in religious organizations), thus giving rise to the dualism attitude. Turner (2007) provides an interesting limitation regarding the categorization of religious leaders that the title is closely related to public recognition of one's capacity in Islam. The above explanation confirms that the strength of the ulama's traditional authority does not guarantee that the expected audience will follow their fatwa. However, on the contrary, the so-called popular leader, e.g., Osama bin Laden, was able to gain the sympathy of many people to follow what he said.

Interestingly, from the perspective of compliance with the government, the data found in the field showed that respondents used reasoning to consider various variables they faced in the community. This is evidenced by the attitude of respondents who took the middle point between the government and religious fatwas (42.3%). This percentage is higher than that of considering the situation and conditions (26.9%). In addition, the respondents have a very high level of compliance with the government (73%), which is represented by the attitude of following its advice to eliminate religious activities that gather the masses. However, this preference has its unique dimension, as evidenced by the low percentage of the respondents who consider compliance proof of citizens' obligations. After the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak around the world, government authorities and the religious community were forced to adapt and help prevent the escalation of the pandemic. Each country applies different regulations regarding implementing religious activities, especially in public spaces (Zhang et al., 2019).

The Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong, encouraged religious meetings and activities to be restricted especially in public spaces, while also shortening the sermon time to minimize the spread of COVID-19 (Lee et al., 2020; Pung et al., 2020). This is supported by the decision of Majelis Ulama Islam Singapore (MUIS), as the holder of religious authority, which issued a fatwa on the closure and termination of approximately 70 mosques throughout Singapore in a certain timeframe (Wong et al., 2020).

Saudi Arabia adopted a similar policy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. One of the regulations set by the kingdom was the temporary cessation of total religious activities at Masjid Al-Haram and Nabawi

Mosque (Al-Tawfiq & Memish, 2020; Algaissi et al., 2020). The regulation is supported by a ban on visiting two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, issued by the relevant authorities. Moreover, near the month of Ramadan, Abdul Latif Al-Sheikh, the Minister of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, and Da'wah of Saudi Arabia, has also issued instructions to its citizens to perform the tarawih and Eid al-Fitr prayers at their respective homes (Barry et al., 2020; Ebrahim & Memish, 2020a). This was reinforced by the fatwa of the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Sheikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Muhammad al-Sheikh related to the policy of eliminating tarawih prayer in the mosque (Ebrahim & Memish, 2020b). On the European continent, Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD), the Muslim Central Council in Germany, officially announced that mosque administrators were permitted to abolish Friday prayers or other congregational prayers for reasons of plague prevention or suspected transmission of the virus (Böhmer et al., 2020; Johnson et al., 2020; Magal & Webb, 2020). At the Vatican, Pope Francis decided not to deliver Sunday sermons from the terrace of St. Peter's Basilica and replace them through the internet to reduce the crowds (Johnson et al., 2020; Mogi & Spijker, 2020; Saglietto et al., 2020).

In Egypt, the government and religious authorities agreed to ban public religious gatherings during Ramadan to stop the spread of COVID-19 (Anis, 2020; Tuite et al., 2020). The religious authority represented by Grand Sheikh Al-Azhar, Ahmed Al-Tayeb, said that obeying government instructions to prevent widespread COVID-19 infection was an obligation for every Muslim in Egypt (Tuite et al., 2020). The same happened in the holy city of Qom, Iran. Government authorities forbade pilgrimage to the holy tomb (Muniz-Rodriguez et al., 2020). The ayatollahs and mullahs supported the government's suggestion after the COVID-19 outbreak in the State of Iran (Mousavi et al., 2020). As with the above countries, the Indonesian government and religious authorities have an interesting spectrum for further study. The diversity authority represented by NU and Muhammadiyah and the responses and contributions of religious figures are the main discussion topics in this study.

In Indonesia, the government and religious authorities also issued a similar policy to minimize the spread of COVID-19. In Southeast Asia, policies issued by the government and Indonesian religious authorities have a time dimension close to that of other countries. On March 16, 2020, the Indonesian government officially suggested worship at home and negating religious activities for a considerable period. Meanwhile, Singapore and Brunei had earlier issued similar bans, namely Singapore on March 3, 2020, and Brunei on March 9, 2020 (Worldometer, 2020). Almost along with Indonesia, the Malaysian government issued a ban on March 17, 2020 (Worldometer, 2020). As a country with the largest Muslim majority population in the Southeast Asian region, the policies issued by the

Indonesian government are relatively more lenient than those of neighboring countries. Indonesian government policy is limited to not praying at the mosque and not carrying out religious activities for a long time. In contrast, countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei strictly forbid the implementation of worship in the mosque. As a suggestion, the Indonesian government's policy has no legal implications if violated by Muslims.

Indonesia's percentage of the population infected and dying from Covid-19 is still relatively low. The researchers believe that it is caused by community compliance with government policies and religious edicts issued by religious leaders. This assessment aligns with the previous explanation that most Indonesian people (82%) are from religious communities, still considering religious leaders role models in worship.

Referring to Bourdieu's theory of social capital, respondents had a compliance rate of 69.7% in religious organizations and 73% in government. The modalities owned by religious leaders and the government have a midpoint (equilibrium) for respondents in determining their attitudes and patterns of choice. However, inconsistencies and dualisms emerge in the preferences and patterns built by respondents regarding their model of compliance with religious organizations and government. In essence, this research has revealed how Indonesian Islamic religious leaders responded to the handling of COVID-19 set by the Indonesian government and how they contributed to policy-making in society. We see the complexity of this problem in the globalization era. The government may not consider the role of these religious leaders in disseminating and influencing the public against government policies. Islamic preachers at the local level associated with NU and Muhammadiyah assuredly become a link of information between the government and the community.

The study contributes to three points: the insights of policy enactment during COVID-19, multifaceted perspectives and obedience of societies to the government and Islamic religious leaders regarding COVID-19 handling, and the prominent status of Islamic figures as a link of information between the government and societies. Regarding policy enactment during the COVID-19 pandemic, the authors suggest policymakers reconsider the roles of Indonesian ulama or religious leaders in the societies since it is revealed that the societies much obey religious leaders' commands. The findings also shed light on the importance of understanding various perspectives from societies with different geographical situations and conditions in Indonesia. As such, people living in urban areas have tendencies to comply with the government's policy, while those living in non-urban areas tend to neglect such a policy. Lastly, stakeholders need to consider religious leaders as a link of information within the societies.

5. Conclusion

This study yielded two main findings. First, most Islamic religious leaders respond to the COVID-19 pandemic calmly, proportionately, and consider it a test from God, so that they take care of their health and pray that the COVID-19 pandemic is immediately dealt with, and contribute to inviting the public to deal with COVID-19. Second, most Islamic religious leaders adhere to the recommendations or *fatwas* of the organization and government policies in dealing with COVID-19.

Unlike the prior studies, this study addresses the theoretical and population gaps. Theoretically, this study enhances Bourdieu's theory of social capital and Max Weber's theory of religious authority to quest the attitude of Islamic religious leaders in handling COVID-19 and the dynamic responses in their organization and the government. In addition, this study suggests distinct population as the respondents are the leaders of *Nahdhatul Ulama* and Muhammadiyah, the most represented Muslim communities in Indonesia. This study suggests the strength of the research method and resources in huge numbers. While it has to be acknowledged that the data comes from a questionnaire, the authors have not been able to expose the respondents' opinions in depth.

Based on these findings, it is recommended that the government cooperate with Islamic religious leaders to handle the COVID-19 pandemic so that the results are optimal. Many Islamic religious leaders adhere to government policies, but they are not directly involved in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. This study suggests that future research enlarge the respondents' number, including the diverse religious leaders representing Christianity, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jews, and other religious denominations. Furthermore, it is suggested that religious leaders be involved in handling other disease pandemics.

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