Hate Speech and Identity Crystallization in Indonesia's Cyberpolitics: Peace-Making Criminology Approach

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Abstract:

This study aims to present aspects of mass psychology and to examine the representation of crimes against hate speech. This study uses a combination of library research design and field research based on virtual ethnography. Virtual ethnographic studies are used to explore the elements that accompany the choices and attitudes of a person or group through interaction data in the world of social media. This is supported by a peacemaking criminology approach to determine the ecosystem for the use of hate speech. This paper proves that a person's motivation to use speech that can offend or cause hatred is strongly influenced by responses to other behaviors. Hate speech undergoes a cultural configuration in a society controlled by the struggle for hegemony and sensitivity to offense. Peacemaking criminology provides an alternative to criminal independence for perpetrators of hate speech after realizing their mistakes and willing to take responsibility. Hate speech is an expression of identity resistance because of a different social environment so that the imposition of criminal sanctions is not based on domination on the basis of revenge and deterrence.

Keywords: hate speech, configuration, culture, identity politics, hegemony, peace.

印度尼西亚网络政治中的仇恨言论和身份结晶：建立和平的犯罪学方法

摘要:

本研究旨在介绍大众心理学的各个方面，并研究针对仇恨言论的犯罪的表现形式。本研究结合图书馆研究设计和基于虚拟民族志的实地研究。虚拟民族志研究用于通过社交媒体世界中的交互数据探索伴随个人或群体的选择和态度的元素。这是由建立和平的犯罪学方法支持的，以确定使用仇恨言论的生态系统。这篇论文证明，一个人使用可能冒犯或引起仇恨的言论的动机受到对其他行为的反应的强烈影响。仇恨言论在

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一个受霸权斗争和对冒犯敏感的社会中经历了一种文化配置。在意识到自己的错误并愿意承担责任后，建立和平犯罪学为仇恨言论的肇事者提供了一种替代犯罪独立的方法。仇恨言论是一种身份反抗的表现，因为不同的社会环境使得刑事制裁的实施不是建立在报复和威慑基础上的支配。

关键词：仇恨言论、配置、文化、身份政治、霸权、和平。

1. Introduction

The dynamics of Indonesian society in the last decade have developed very rapidly. People who are very forgiving and friendly turn out to be very sensitive to differences. Fragmentation occurs in various fields, thus reinforcing the emergence of political sects *(politik aliran)*. Geertz (1976) introduced the politics of sects in Indonesia with the trichotomy of Javanese society in the form of santri, priyayi and abangan. Political divisions and social class are considered to have melted after the reform era, experiencing re-strengthening in the holding of the 2014 Presidential Election (Pilpres) and the 2017–2018 Regional Head Election (Pilkada). The increasingly blurred ideology of political parties has transformed identity politics by using hate speech in society.

Identity politics in the study of social movements is often related to campaigns for the defense and struggle for the interests of specific groups because of feelings of oppression due to their identity (Gutmann, 2003). Identity politics is not only interpreted as groups struggling from oppression but can also be interpreted to restore identity to differentiate between multiple identities (Anspach, 1979, pp. 765–773). In the presidential election contestation, two identities of political power emerged that developed to the current political contestation. Each group builds a collective identity, but the stigmatization of other groups also accompanies it (Goffman, 1986, p. 4). One strategy of stigmatization is, of course, closely related to the practice of hate speech.

In Indonesia, the contestation of power that places religion or ethnicity as part of the mobilization strategy in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections (Pilpres) and the 2017–2018 Regional Head Election (Pilkada). This condition affects the division of society that develops into the strengthening of intolerance and extremism. The culminating truth claims cause actions that can be hate speech and hate spin.

Hate speech has the main target to persecute the targeted group or vulnerable groups to encourage mass offense and violence. Hate speech has a long historical trajectory that can at least be linked to the ethnic cleansing of Native Americans and Australians by white colonies, the enslavement and ethnic cleansing of Jews during the Nazi era, and several social conflicts that emphasized the difference between "us" and "them." Hate speech is a powerful instrument in identity politics. Based on this background, this study discusses the relationship between identity politics and hate speech in contemporary Indonesia, especially after the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, and the 2017 regional elections.

2. Research Method

The study was conducted using a qualitative research model and using virtual ethnographic research methods. The primary source of this research is behavior patterns in mass communication on social media over a certain time, which are considered related to identity politics and hate speech responses. This primary source is used to determine the construction of identity politics and speech categorization in social media.

The virtual ethnographic method is carried out systematically on the natural conditions in communication on social media. Observations were made to determine the psychology of society on the models and characteristics of communication through social media. This method is to identify patterns of behavior, patterns of social relations in the virtual world that are vulnerable to hate speech. Social life develops through information technology, which is expressed through emotions, recognition, and conversational styles. The data criteria used as observations with the virtual ethnographic method, namely the selection of virtual communities on social media based on interactions within the community, such as views, likes and comments between members. The data criteria are also determined based on the selection of discussion topics or discussions that can be carried out using the process of mapping (framing) issues that develop in the virtual community.

3. Hate Speech and the New Model of Cyberpolitics

The DailySocial survey shows that social media is a medium for spreading fake news and hate speech. 82.25% of respondents received fake news (hoax) from Facebook, 56.55% from WhatsApp, and 29.48% from Instagram. The most extensive age range of respondents was 20–25 years with a composition of 42.12 percent, for respondents aged 16–19 as many as 11.20 percent, respondents aged 26–29 years as much as 25.52 percent, and between 30 and 35 as many as 15, 96 percent. The DailySocial survey confirms that 94.80% of millennial youth can receive fake news (hoax) and are vulnerable to hate speech. In this survey, the type of hoax is dominated by political and racial issues, accompanied by social engineering in the form of psychological sentiments to influence someone to test or accept information that is considered correct. The phenomenon of not clarifying the truth affects the

emergence of disinformation and misinformation among people who feel threatened.

The threat variable is an issue that is often used as material for hate speech on social media. The presence of the volunteer network JASMEV (Jokowi Ahok Social Media Volunteers) on August 12, 2012, at least marked the first time that a campaign in Indonesia had relied on a political marketing strategy through social media. So far, the political contestations have always relied on centralized information in one account or one source of data from the success team. At the same time, JASMEV, led by Kartika Djoemadi, played a strategy to spread issues from each volunteer owner of a social media account. This massive and systematic spread of information agrees with the design of the Cyrus Network Team coordinated by Hasan Hasbi Batupahat in managing the Jokowi-Ahok war room to monitor 15 thousand volunteers in the field, with 706 coordinators and 42 strategic supervisors.

The presence of political volunteers in the 2012 DKI gubernatorial election underwent a formalization in the 2014 presidential election contestation. 1,248 political volunteer organizations from the Jokowi and Prabowo camps organized themselves with an independence system and support from other parties (Arianto, 2014, pp. 146–202). Volunteers as a new form of social movement contribute positively to developing an extra-parliamentary democracy model by creating identity myths to influence people's political choices. The Jokowi-JK camp launched the tabloid Rahmatan Lil 'Alamin, while the Prabowo-Hatta camp launched the Obor Rakyat tabloid. The dynamics of image formation through mass media form a war strategy among volunteers with propaganda that leads to hate politics.

Jokowi, as a party official, as stated directly by the Chairperson of the PDIP, Megawati, became the central issue of the Prabowo camp attack. The reframing was carried out that Jokowi was a puppet presidential candidate who only worked on the orders of party leaders. However, Jokowi's team attacked Prabowo with the issue of being the actor behind the 1998 kidnapping of activists at the end of the New Order regime. Framing was used by Jokowi volunteers on social media by mentioning the identity of "fired" as the construction of Prabowo's negative image. Efforts to bring back the alleged 1998 human rights violations became a political attack strategy against Prabowo in the 2014 presidential election contestation and are still reproduced in the 2019 presidential election contest as a cruel or psychopathic figure.

Hate speech and displays of political intolerance in the 2014 presidential election contestation were seen in the advertisement entitled 'Rest in Peace Jokowi.' The ad that stated that Jokowi had died on May 4, 2014, at 15.30 WIB, was written with Ir. Hambertus Joko Widodo and Oey Hong Liong's Chinese name. The racial aspect that Jokowi is of Chinese descent is the main ingredient in influencing the political attitudes of the voting public. Political attacks on Prabowo are linked to the family origins of a Minahasan Christian mother named Dora Marie Sugar. Religious sentiment is played to eliminate the majority of Muslim community's support for Prabowo.

Hate speeches collected in black and negative campaigns have become a universal phenomenon in world politics. The essence of black and negative campaigns is to build a balousyerception or stigma in the community about specific candidates who participate in political contestations. There are three models of voters making choices. First, the sociological model is influenced by the similarity of predictors in religion, ethnicity, age, gender, education, and income, so religious and ethnic identity issues are still often used as mobilization strategies. Second, the psychological model, which is strongly influenced by the candidate's personality, campaign theme, and the perception of the political party, is better known as partisanship or party identification (Party ID). Third, the rational model that is often measured based on an economic approach is in the form of profit calculations, political parties that require bidding. At the same time, bidding is conducted by voters (Downs, 1957, pp. 135–150). The campaign strategy of building stigma and hate speech is carried out to influence people's political choices, especially for prospective voters who have not chosen their voting models before the election.

Expressions of criticism insulting and demeaning in online interactions among volunteers or voting members can cause heated situations in the community. In this condition, the perpetrators who express opinions by demeaning the opposing party are called haters, while their activities are called flaming. Flame in social media wars often extends to cyberbullying in intimidation and violence via the internet, quickly recorded through activities like dislike, comment, unfollow, and block. The uproar that occurs due to flaming on social media can occur in the real world with the construction of hatred that leads to the use of violence or extremism based on identity sentiment.

The global community, including Indonesia, currently tends to choose the use of social media to mobilize support and attitudes of rejection. The phenomenon of the use of social media and internet networks makes a new model in the world of politics known as cyberpolitics or cyber politics. A blog or internet site and a person's social media account can be used to manipulate the image of a particular political group. Cyberspace is a very inexpensive medium and can reach a broad audience.

Cyberpolitics ahead of the 2019 presidential election was marked by a hashtag war to classify political narratives. Mardani Ali Sera, a PKS cadre, initiated the #2019ChangePresident movement to compete for popularity in cyberspace and the real world. The action was started in February 2018, which was carried out using hashtags at the end of each social media narration. T-shirts simultaneously followed the #2019ChangePresident movement with the hashtag #2019ChangePresident, songs, and videos with the theme #2019GantiPresiden for mobilization and

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declarations of activities in several regions (Sera, 2018). The order of the #2019ChangePresident movement nationally was carried out on May 6, 2018, at Silang Monas, Jakarta.

The line of government supporters created many counter hashtags with various editorials. Hashtags of support for the government such as #DiaSibukKerja, #JokowiLagi, #Jokowi24, #2019NantiPresiden, #Jokowi2Periode, #2019TetapPresiden. The different hashtags of Jokowi's supporters reflect the absence of focused support communication. With all its power tools and communication teams, the government has stuttered in responding to the hashtag war movement. Prabowo supporters or coalitions outside the government can maintain the #2019ChangePresident movement's solidity as the only hashtag of resistance. All attacks on government policies that are deemed unpopular or affect the sociological proximity of voters are confronted with the hashtag changing president.

Holders of hegemony in power and the ranks of government supporters tend to take repressive actions despite the development of the #2019ChangePresident movement. Several acts of intimidation and discrimination occurred in various regions by deploying state officials to conduct raids and ban declarations. The obstruction by parties on behalf of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) against Neno Warisman in the #2019ChangePresident representation at Hang Nadim Airport on July 28–29, 2018, is considered a partiality by state officials. Neno Warisman experienced mass siege and acts of anarchism, so he could not get out of the airport. The terror conditions have not been able to stop the #2019ChangePresident declaration event on July 29, 2018. The intimidation of supporters of the #2019ChangePresident word continues in several regions.

Several arrangements from the security forces followed the blocking action against the declarations of opposition groups in several areas. The Head of the National Police's Security Intelligence Agency (Kabaintelkam) issued a telegram letter Number STR/1852/VIII/2018 dated August 30, 2018. The National Police, based on the subjectivity of the potential for conflict in society, did not permit the #2019ChangePresident declaration in several regions. However, the security forces tend to let the #Jokowi2Period supporters take action in several areas. The stigmatization of supporters of #2019GantiPresiden is carried out through the stereotype of the treason movement against the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. Actions of rejection with elements of violence by several parties considered to be government supporters have influenced the open resistance of supporters of the #2019ChangePresident. The political configuration of the 2019 presidential election repeats the contestation as in the 2014 presidential election, which was fragmented on the identity of the PDIP coalition and the Gerindra coalition.

The stigma of treason against a person or a group accompanied by hate speech and political intolerance is a form of identity construction. The stigma through the formation of negative perceptions or stereotypes becomes an effort to mobilize to identify the friend and the opposing party. Stereotypes cause adverse emotional reactions, so there are efforts to eliminate them, better known as discrimination. In such a position, there will always be contestations or struggles through cultural power if there are groups who experience expressions of administration being humiliated, humiliated, or disqualified from social acceptance because they are considered deviant.

Articulations negatively associated with stigma are influenced by physical appearance, negative behavioral characteristics, and ethnic, religious, racial, and inter-group differences (SARA). These three factors make the social sentiment, or the elimination of a person's or group's identity can always appear in the community. A discourse battle enlivened the stigma process in the 2019 presidential election through social media. The usage of social media such as Twitter and Facebook into a unified political communication strategy strengthens the role of successful teams and volunteers in the field. Social media can make election issues in Indonesia a trending topic, thereby influencing public conversations in the real world.

Cyberpolitics popularized by social media accounts of political parties and volunteers has influenced the increase in the number of participants in the 2019 presidential election. All political parties have finally realized the effectiveness of social media in mobilizing political support. This reality is marked by the emergence of party accounts in several forms of social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Although internet use is unevenly distributed in Indonesia, civil society and political parties in Indonesia have built a more dynamic contestation stage.

The 2014–2019 political contestation was marked by accusations of treason against figures supporting Prabowo. The authorities also used the determination of the treason suspect in responding to the 212 actions in December 2016. Eleven people were arrested: Kivlan Zen, Ratna Sarumpaet, Rachmawati, Ahmad Dhani, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, Rizal Kobar, Adityawarman Thaha, Firza Husein, Alvin Indra Al Fariz, Eko, and Jamran. Eggi Sudjana is a suspect connected to an invitation to people power after the 2019 presidential election. Lieut Sungkharisma was arrested during a police raid, suspected of spreading false news and an attempt at treason. Permadi was suspected because of the words in a video that invited a revolution. Several retired TNI supporters who support Prabowo have been charged with treason or conspiracy, including Kivlan Zen, Soenarko, and Sofyan Jacob. They are considered to have orchestrated the scenario for the riots resulting from presidential election on May 22, 2019.

The contestation through social media in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections has created two positive and negative patterns. The control of political groups

over social media ultimately increases a dominant population and a minority population. The dominant population can be seen based on how many followers, likes, favorites, and shares are from a social media account. Effective social media offers opportunities for political contestants to mobilize voters, interact directly with potential voters, and create close relationships with the voting public. However, social media has become an effective tool to criticize and ridicule contestants who are considered unable to represent political aspirations. Social media is becoming the fastest way to provide information and manipulate reality.

The reality of the stigmatization of political opponents or groups outside the government as radical and treason is evidence of Indonesia's declining democracy index. The oligarchic political culture in the form of the unification of wealth and political power in Indonesia can make power-holders authoritarian. A view played by Jokowi in the second period related to verbal violence was to take advantage of the authority of radical stigma. The cabinet's announcement and the introduction of ministerial candidates at the palace accompanied affirmation of the war against radicalism. President Jokowi himself used the term "religious manipulator," referring to parties outside the government.

Sociologically, radicalism can be understood as a response to the political alienation of several groups that have not yet received easy access to social, political, economic, and cultural access (Izzuddin & Fata, 2020). Political estrangement or political alienation can affect the emergence of resistance to change conditions to suit the affiliation of ideological or religious truth (truth claim). Several issues became the driving factors for social movements which were stigmatized as radicals, such as the injustice felt by society, widespread corruption in almost all state institutions, challenging economic conditions, elite political struggles that sacrificed people's interests, and the gap between rich and poor. Radical stigma against a group accompanied by hate speech, political intolerance, and religious intolerance is an identity construction for political mobilization and a mechanism for identifying friends with opposing parties.

4. Primordial Identity Vulnerability in Indonesia

Identity is the process of unifying various symbols and signs into a single self-concept that serves to distinguish it from other parties. The concept of identity from the study of sociology and social psychology is an attribute to distinguish it from others due to interaction with other parties (Ellemer et al., 2002, pp. 161–186). This process gives the meaning that identity categories tend to be flexible and very easy to change according to the operation of purpose and interests in the interaction. An identity is formed through social interactions of various entities, maintained, modified, and altered through social processes (Snow & Benford, 2005). The

identity formation can be built by individuals, social structures, and the interest in maintaining or changing according to the social context.

One's identity cannot be separated from a sense of awareness of the collectivity relationship. This awareness is permanently attached to each individual and community as a characteristic that distinguishes one from another. Individual personalities can have different features, either through the process of experience, belief, or identification that is carried out. In the end, these differences increase dominance between individuals in achieving the goals of a community. Shifting interests in the struggle for power and competition in a social movement can affect the demand for recognition of an identity. Various social groups with their respective cultures have contributed to the contestation between groups. Group contestation is often accompanied by the use of identity as a basis for struggle, so it is called identity politics.

A particular person or group can create an identity for other parties, and other parties can provide the opposite identity. Therefore, giving an identity can be shared or natural as the Javanese ethnicity is different from the Arab and Chinese ethnicities, but it can also be built-in labeling. A child born from a family that supports Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosoewiryo will maintain his family's political identity. This movement once formed an Islamic state by proclaiming the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) on August 7, 1949, in Tasikmalaya. The failure of parents as NII activists in establishing Darul Islam at least influenced the transformation of the movement, which still selects an Islamic State.

As a supporter of the constructionist paradigm, Bandura (2012) views that behavior based on differences in identity is a response to reality and traditions in social life. Constructivism is formed through acceptance and rejection processes based on interpretation or a reaction to internal factors, the external environment, and the response to behavioral actions that influence (Bandura, 2012, p. 3). In this process, a common interpretation forms a group and differences in performance according to the identities used. This difference in performance can encourage criminal acts in the form of hate speech if it is influenced by the social contestation environment that promotes hate politics.

Human actions are social practices that are repeated and patterned across space and time. The existence of a span of space and time can affect the formation of a person as a social actor who reflects social practices in specific structures or rules. The design or arrangements that a person makes as an agency can impact the emergence of identity negotiations. Giddens (1991, pp. 102–103), as a figure known as structuration theory, states that a person is not a passive entity but is determined by external influences that produce politics of self-actualization.

The relationship between the individual and external factors as a regulatory structure generates individual

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and collectivity-based identities. A person can take advantage of the diversity in society to create an identity so that individuals no longer be themselves but adopt various types of personality based on existing structures. The theoretical approach of several figures has at least the same characteristics confirming that identity is not something singular and static. An identity can change according to the influencing factors and the underlying interests. Identity is constructed as a product of negotiation, interpretation, and presentation in social interactions. Identity is one of the essential factors for determining criminal behavior because identity itself results from the performance of social behavior. Identity characteristics are often used to mobilize deviant behaviors in people's lives, such as identity politics accompanied by hate speech.

As happened in the 2017 DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election, the polarization of social groups affects the mobilization of support based on the politicization of identity. The condition of democracy has become a concern of the national and international community as transnational activism is rampant in various countries. The presence of workers from China in several infrastructure projects in Jakarta and other areas raises suspicions of a scenario of Indonesian citizenship against foreign nationals ahead of the presidential and regional elections. The framing of news on the Jakarta Bay reclamation as a basis for economic power and a place to live for Chinese citizens is one of the strong influences of identity polarization.

Ahok's volunteers, in the battle of discourse on social media and mass media coverage, built Islamophobia into political marketing. The issue of radicalism, which is capitalized on a massive and structured basis, is directed at Anies Baswedan's close relationship with the leader of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Habib Rizieq Shihab. Anies' meeting with several leaders of Islamic Organizations and other Islamic figures, as if deliberately unreported. The political attack on Anies Baswedan in the Jakarta gubernatorial election contestation resulted in a framing of the unification of radical Islam in power politics.

The Islamophobic strategy was built to reduce Anies-Sandi's electoral power but failed results. Shalawat and taklim assemblies led by Hadhrami community leaders with subtle and polite identities directed the congregation to support Anies-Sandi. The Jakarta Ulama and Habib Forum (FUHAB) supported Agus-Silvi in the first round, shifting support to Anies-Sandi. FUHAB, led by KH Syukron Ma'mun, is a combination of Islamic and Betawi mass organizations in DKI. Bamus Betawi as a member of FUHAB, for example, has 67 Betawi organizations. The stigmatization of Anies voters as supporters of the radical and intolerant Habib Rizieq became problematic.

After the 2019 presidential election, the distribution of the winning areas for the Prabowo-Sandi pair was considered a hard-line religious area. Mahfud MD made a statement on April 29, 2019, in response to efforts to reconcile the two couples who contested the presidential election. The hardline province is meant to categorize people with Islamic fanaticism in defense of religion. West Java once developed the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII) through the DI/TII movement, which Aceh and South Sulawesi followed. Another development was the establishment of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in West Sumatra, as a response to dissatisfaction with Sukarno.

The four provinces as Prabowo's support basis have the same cultural character. The Sundanese, Acehnese, Mining, and Bugis, as the majority ethnic groups in the region, have at least assessed candidates based on their nature, religion, and cultural history. Although the 2019 presidential election pairs both carry Islamic identity, the sense of Islam offered by Jokowi-Ma'ruf is different in the four regions. Ma'ruf Amin comes from the NU organization and has a different culture from the people of West Java, Aceh, and West Sumatra, who do not get dominant NU influence. The concept and jargon of Islam Nusantara, which has experienced controversy in several Islamic organizations outside NU, has further distanced support (Fata & Ichwan, 2017).

Verbal violence after the 2014 presidential election and the 2019 presidential election in the form of radical stigma occurred among several employees of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The issue of the identity of "Taliban Police" and "Indian Police" as accusations that describe divisions between investigators has been growing since 2009. Neta S. Pane, as Chair of the Presidium of Indonesia Police Watch (IPW), is considered the first person to introduce the framing of KPK investigators in 2009. The Indian Police refers to the KPK investigators. In contrast, the Taliban Police refers to the group of investigators Novel Baswedan who is in the KPK Employee Center. The term "Taliban" is a description of verbal violence directed at radicalization in the bodies of some KPK investigators. The involvement of BNPT and BIN in the selection of KPK leaders in May 2019 is a strong indication of driving radical perceptions within the KPK.

The issue of the Taliban is increasingly being developed on social media through cyber troops and computational propaganda. These steps are carried out through propaganda with computations in the form of algorithms, automation, and the use of data in big data (Bradshaw, 2019). The leading social media platforms actively used for manipulation are Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Youtube, and Instagram. The extreme stigmatization of several KPK investigators through social media impacts public doubts about the KPK's performance. The public's distrust of the KPK due to daily attacks on social media has become the main door for revising Law Number 30 of 2002 concerning the KPK. The narrative developed in conversations on social media is the need to change the KPK Law and

support the new KPK leadership candidates.

The radical stigma against 75 KPK employees considered "Taliban Police" drags employees across religions. Employees with beards and short pants are identified as adherents of radical Islam, as directed against the Novel Baswedan and Giri Suprapdiono groups. The radical investigator's narrative contradicts that there are seven non-Muslim employees, namely 7 Christians, 1 Buddhist, and 1 Hindu. Many Christian employees include Andre Dhedy Nainggolan, Hotman Tambunan (founder of Oikumene), Rasamala Aritonang, Herbert Nababan, T. Simanjuntak, SF. Siahaan, and Benydictus Siumlala. In another position, Rieswin was a Buddhist employee and IVK as a Hindu who did not pass the TWK. The stigma of "Taliban Police," apart from being a form of accusation to reduce the legitimacy of the community, is also part of the politics of hate.

The defeat of Prabowo Subianto, accompanied by the call for people power by Amien Rais, indeed became the reality of the poor condition of Indonesian democracy. The call for people power, which the authorities could accuse as an attempt of treason, was finally changed by Amien Rais himself by using a new term, namely the People's Sovereignty Movement. Violent displays will not benefit the political contestants. The weapons smuggling incident accused of the former Commander General of the Special Forces Command (Kopassus), Soenarko, was linked to treason attempts using mass demonstrations to reject the 2019 election results. A total of 8 people were killed, 737 people were injured, and 257 people were arrested in the 21–22 action. May 2019 voiced allegations of fraud in the 2019 presidential election in the Thamrin and surrounding areas. The rioting of the masses on the eve of the election announcement indicates politics invaded by several vested interests in politics.

The mass action, concentrated in the Bawaslu Building, Central Jakarta, occurred on Tuesday, May 21, 2019, and turned into a violent act on Wednesday morning, May 22, 2019. Demonstrations over election fraud will still not change the election results because the only constitutional route is through the Constitutional Court. Prabowo and Jokowi's reconciliation led some voters to build a new contestant identity, namely Jokowi versus Anies Baswedan. This reality emerged after the Jokowi-Ma'ruf cabinet accommodated the Gerindra Party through Prabowo Subianto as Minister of Defense and Why Prabowo as Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. The image that became the background for their meeting at the Sate Khas Senayan restaurant, Sudirman, Jakarta, on July 13, 2019, developed into a new identity. Jokowi's supporters receive a stigmatized identity as Togog people, and Prabowo's supporters are stigmatized as Semar.

Political violence is at least a legacy of every ruler. At the beginning of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf administration, some groups potentially initiated this practice with the issuance of a Joint Decree (SKB) on Handling Radicalism in the Context of Strengthening National Insights in the State Civil Apparatus. The SKB was signed by six Ministers and five heads of state institutions in November 2019. Each of them is the Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform (Menpan RB), Minister of Home Affairs (Mendagri), Minister of Law and Human Rights (Menkumham), Minister of Religion, Minister of Education and Culture (Mendikbud), Minister of Communication and Information (Kominfo), Chief of National Intelligent Agency (BIN), Chief of National Agency on Terrorism Eradication (BNPT), Head of National Employment Agency (BKN), Head of the Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (BPIP), and Head of National Civil Service Commission.

The ratification of the SKB Radicalism for ASN is considered by some civilians to limit the freedom of expression and become an instrument of political control over the ASN. According to the holder of power, the ASN Radicalism SKB regulates 11 types of violations that have the potential for multiple interpretations. Hate speeches against Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Bhineka Tunggal Ika, and the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, for example, are considered to add to the overlapping rules. Hate speech is already regulated in the Criminal Code, the ITE Law, and the Law on the Elimination of Discrimination, so the legal mechanism is obvious. ASN Radicalism SKB is considered to can be used to silence ASN resistance to lousy government practices.

The decree on ASN radicalism can, of course, run under two conditions. First, running means labeling ASN with opposing interests or different political aspirations. Second, the SKB will not run effectively within the ASN itself. The internal regulatory mechanism for ASN is already available with complaint departments and supervisory agencies, such as the Indonesian ombudsperson in each region, the Inspectorate General in each government agency, and the ASN Commission.

ASN Radicalism SKB by several criminal law experts is considered a form of deviation, disorientation, and distortion of the meaning of terrorism (Izzuddin & Fata, 2020). Deviation or deviation from a behavior that is called radical is still unclear, as are the 11 types of violations: 1) Opinions that contain hatred towards Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Bhineka Tunggal Ika, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the Government; 2) Opinions through social media that contain hatred towards SARA; 3) Disseminating opinions that contain hate as referred to in Points 1 and 2; 4) Making misleading news; 5) Spreading misleading news; 6) Holding activities that lead to acts of insulting, inciting, provoking, and hating Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Bhineka Tunggal Ika, the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, and the government; 7) Attending activities as referred to in Point 6; 8) Respond or support as a sign of agreement with opinions as referred to in points 1 and 2; 9) Using attributes contrary to

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Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Bhineka Tunggal Ika, NKRI, and the government; 10) Abusing national symbols; 11) Actions 1-10 are carried out consciously by ASN. Disorientation from the coaching process that should have been conducted to develop national insight has become a tool for silencing or screening ASN for or against the government.

The coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) pandemic in early 2020 became the momentum for the government and political elites to limit the freedom of expression. The pretext of prohibiting crowds during the pandemic has become a strategy to silence a group of people advocating for legislation programs in the DPR. Fifty bills are included in the priority National Legislation Program (Prolegnas), such as the Corruption Eradication Commission Bill, the Pancasila Ideology Bill, the Job Creation Bill or the Job Creation Omnibus Law, the Criminal Code Bill, the Amendment Bill to Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning Elections, and the Bill on Amendments to Law Number 4 of 2009 concerning Mineral and Coal Mining.

The rejection of several bills in the National Legislation Program began in early 2020. The political frenzy started with a hand arrest operation (OTT) by the KPK against the KPU commissioner, Wahyu Setiawan, on January 8, 2020. The OTT was related to bribes in determining the interim replacement (PAW) for members of the DPR by PDIP politician Harun Masika. The disclosure of the bribery case by PDIP politicians was marked by incidents of confinement and intimidation of KPK investigators while hunting for Harun Masiku and the PDIP politicians at the Police Science College (PTIK) complex, South Jakarta. On January 9, 2020, the KPK named four suspects in the PAW bribery case of PDIP candidates: Wahyu Setiawan, Harun Masika, Saeful, and Agustiani Tio Fridelina, who was a former member of Bawaslu and later became active as a candidate for the DPR RI from PDIP.

The political constellation in mid-2020 was marked by the rejection of several components of civil society toward the discussion of several Prolegnas Bills. The government is considered to have recruited several influencers and buzzers to campaign for several issues on social media. The Research Institute for Economic and Social Education and Information (LP3ES), for example, found that conversations on social media were dominated by political party clusters supporting the Omnibus Law on Job Creation. The analysis was carried out by LP3ES Media Analytics on October 3–13, 2020, from the ratification of phase 1 by the DPR on the Job Creation Bill until the announcement of the final draft by the government.

The use of influencers and buzzers is an effort to mobilize support and manipulate public awareness. Public perceptions that tend to be forced because they do not match reality, for example, move on the issue of changing the leadership of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), support for revisions to the KPK

Law, cabinet reshuffle, successful handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, including support for modifications to the Constitutional Court Law. This quasi-campaign by buzzers was carried out with the hashtag #IndonesiaButuhKerja. Musician Ardhito Pramono, for example, admits that he gets Rp. 10 million for each upload, so he feels cheated for his move. A study by Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) has revealed that the government spent Rp. 90.4 billion, paying influencers and buzzers.

State violence against students and civil society coalitions occurred during the rejection of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (Cilaka). Amnesty International Indonesia stated that there were 402 victims of state violence in the protest against the Job Creation Bill. In collaboration with the Crisis Evidence Lab and Digital Verification Corps Amnesty International, Amnesty Indonesia has verified 51 videos as evidence of 43 incidents of violence in 15 provinces by state officials between October 6 and November 10, 2020. Amnesty also stated that 6,658 people were arrested from 21 areas, were subsequently arrested. As many as 301 people were detained for different periods. The arrests also occurred for 18 journalists; 18 people in 7 provinces became suspects because they were accused of violating the Law on Information and Electronic Transactions (ITE).

The saturation of society at least affects social disobedience to the government. Saturation occurs due to the COVID-19 pandemic when people experience several restrictions on their activities; the government and DPR are free to pass bills that can harm the community and benefit certain parties. The government responded to student protests and civil society groups with various kinds of silence under the pretext of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as prohibiting actions, blocking action points, arrests, and torture.

Political violence occurred, which some considered through a series of intelligence operations. This is what happened to the Habib Rizieq Shihab group (HRS) or the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the exponents of Action 212, and the moral movement group of the Indonesian Rescue Action Coalition (KAMI). The ongoing political operations can be seen through the instrumentation of criminal law against several FPI activists, 212 activists, and KAMI activists since the political defeat of the capitalist group's proxy war in the 2017 DKI Jakarta election, including many WE activists in several regions.

HRS' "political exile" in Saudi Arabia since April 2017 ended on November 10, 2020. HRS arrived at Soekarno-Hatta Terminal 3 at 09.00 WIB, to a very large crowd. This welcoming act can become a legal case for violating health protocols. On November 14, 2020, HRS held the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad while also marrying his daughter Syarifah Najwa Shihab with Habib Muhammad Irvan Alaydrus. Many FPI masses were present at Petamburan, so the DKI Jakarta Provincial Government considered that the

event violated health protocols and imposed an administrative sanction of a fine of 50 million rupiah.

A bloody tragedy occurred with the death of 6 FPI soldiers who were escorting HRS to a family study in Karawang early on Monday, December 7, 2020. HRS guards died at Km 50 of the Cikampek Toll Road, with gunshot wounds and scars from persecution that caused controversy in the community. The Metro Jaya Regional Police followed up on the Km 50 case by naming HRS a suspect. HRS was called a case of alleged incitement to Article 160 of the Criminal Code and Article 93 of Law Number 6 of 2018 concerning Health Quarantine and 5 FPI administrators, such as KH. Ahmad Sobri Lubis and Habib Hanif Alatas.

5. Peacemaking Criminology As an Approach

Identity politics is a political strategy that focuses on differences and the usage of primordial ties. The bond can be based on religion, ethnicity, and gender that humans naturally carry from birth. Therefore, identity politics develops according to one's self-identification and beliefs based on birth identity or essentialism. However, the politicization of identity, both the existence of primordial ties and human efforts to form them, can lead to tolerance and patterns of intolerance. Identity politics does not exist in a vacuum but is influenced by the contestation of cultural, social, natural, and invisible powers. Therefore, the handling of hate speech as an encouragement for differences in identity can be done by considering the local wisdom of the local culture.

The invisible power of power, like the economy, is often hidden in the political contestation of hatred. Ethnicity problems that occur in the United States, for example, tend to be influenced by economic interests and the employment crisis between blacks and whites. The tradition of conflict in the name of ethnicity or skin color that occurs in several regions of the world is at least triggered by the struggle for economic access and cultural power in the form of psychological discrimination against the majority. A peaceful approach to several conflicts due to the spirit of hatred certainly requires a collaborative dialog process.

An identity can be used to create community solidity if it is appropriately constructed. The weakness that emerges in society is that the contestation of diversity is considered a necessity to eliminate the role of others. In this position, the ability to elaborate sensitivity to differences, often referred to as sociocultural abilities, becomes critical. Sociocultural aspects make a person recognize his role in society, recognize community characteristics, and awareness of living together in a community under any conditions.

Sociocultural competence can be developed in various ways. The first is religious moderation. This development is carried out by providing tolerant spiritual substance. Conflicts between religious people and violence in the name of religion tend to be influenced by models of spiritual understanding that are constantly confronted. Religion is often used as a justification for competition and a threat to the existence of other religions. The contestation in moderation should be encouraged in the contestation of goodness. Each religious community must develop themselves and their community at their best capacity, including education, economy, health, culture, including politics (Izzuddin & Fata, 2020; Najib & Fata, 2020). If awareness about spiritual immunity is formed internally, it will be easy to do cross-religious work together.

Second is the development of state defense awareness. The contestation of identity in several areas tends to be influenced by a collective understanding that is not yet on the unity of the nation's entity. Ethnicity and religious identity will be part of the ongoing national problem if awareness as a nation has not been unified. A country is a combination of several entities and identities bound in the image of ideals. The development of state defense awareness can be done by working together based on local wisdom, integrating local culture in daily activities, and unifying multiple identities to accept differences.

Human actions are social practices that are repeated and patterned across space and time. The existence of a span of space and time can affect the formation of a person as a social actor who reflects social practices in specific structures or rules. The design or arrangements that a person makes as an agency can impact the emergence of identity negotiations. In this position, the development of sociocultural abilities can at least minimize the stigmatization of identity that leads to discrimination. The relationship between the individual and external factors as a regulatory structure generates individual and collectivity-based identities. A person can take advantage of the diversity in society to create an identity so that individuals no longer be themselves but adopt various types of personality based on existing structures. In such a position, individual negotiation is closely related to the social, organizational structure's role in constructing identity.

6. Conclusion

One's identity cannot be separated from a sense of awareness of the collectivity relationship. This awareness is permanently attached to each individual and community as a characteristic that distinguishes one from another. Individual personalities can have different features, either through the process of experience, belief, or identification that is carried out. In the end, these differences cause dominance between individuals in achieving the goals of a community. Shifting interests in the struggle for power and competition in a social movement can affect the demand for recognition of an identity. Various social groups with their respective cultures have contributed to the contestation between groups. The use of identity often accompanies group contestation as a basis for the struggle, so it is called identity politics.

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An identity is not something singular and static. An identity can change according to the influencing factors and the underlying interests. Identity is constructed as a product of negotiation, interpretation, and presentation in social interactions. Identity is an essential factor in determining voter behavior, because identity itself results from political identification. Such identity characteristics identify the type or form of identity used as voter mobilization in the political process. The development of the socio-cultural field will provide the ability to organize the same identity to achieve common interests. It is not easy to achieve a sense of belonging or the choice of the same identity without eliminating other identities. Still, development steps must be carried out with improvements in the socio-cultural field in the form of local wisdom and common ground amid cultural diversity.

The local wisdom of the community actually affects the shift in values, so that it can be a peaceful approach in hate speech conflicts. The framework is that local wisdom creates awareness construction to raise the perpetrators of hate speech not in the position of being sentenced, but to repair the damage. This is like the essence of the criminal justice system itself, namely the short-term resocialization, the medium-term crime prevention, while the long term is to create public welfare and security.

Peacemaking criminology views crime as the result of social construction and is related to the process of marginalizing opposing identities. Hate speech arises because of the dialectic of two or more identities that trigger violent reactions or angry emotions. In such a position, uniting the opposing identities into one big identity or the inclusion of each related party is a necessity. Peacemaking criminology is very concerned with rebuilding relationships after a crime has occurred, rather than aggravating conflict and tension. This is clearly different from the concept of "the law is the commander in chief" that some people understand that all violations of the law and crimes must be given the most severe sanctions.

The philosophy of retribution or retaliation in the criminal justice system needs to be corrected. The retributive philosophy only emphasizes the three needs of the criminal justice system, namely the need for sanctions against criminal acts, the need to assist in the rehabilitation of perpetrators, and the need to strengthen public security. There are some needs to be developed. First, the need to improve and recover the losses for the victims of criminal acts and the community to the fullest. Second, the need to emphasize the best interests of the perpetrators because of the limitations of criminal sanctions and guidance (the limits of treatment and punishment).

Peacemaking criminology uses a balanced approach between perpetrators, victims, and the community. This approach encourages the need for dialog that is peacemaking circles. An alternative to criminal independence is given if the perpetrator has realized his mistake and is willing to take responsibility. However, this peaceful situation is certainly very difficult to realize because open dialog accompanied by an exploration of the views of the community regarding crime, still tends to be dominated by the spirit of revenge rather than improving harmony and balance.

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