

Open Access Article

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Chinese Gateway to the Indian Ocean Region

Hidayatullah Khan¹, Geetha Govindasamy^{2*}, Md. Nasrudin Md. Akhir³

¹ *Doctoral Candidate, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia*

² *Senior Lecturer, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia*

³ *Associate Professor, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Malaya, 50603 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia*

Received: October 17, 2021 ▪ Reviewed: November 11, 2021

▪ Accepted: December 10, 2021 ▪ Published: January 28, 2022

Abstract:

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) flagship project that connects Kashgar in China with Gwadar in Pakistan. This paper analyses the reasons behind China's intention to transform Pakistan through CPEC as a gateway to the Indian Ocean. By conducting unstructured interviews with experts and examining projects under the CPEC and the dynamic interaction between power and space, this paper found that, upon its successful completion, the CPEC will serve as a gateway for China in reducing its vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean region. Simultaneously, it is predicted that the CPEC will transform China, a hinterland state, into a resident power in the Indian Ocean region, thereby challenging the 'enclosed geopolitical space and strategic nature' of the Indian Ocean. Much has been written on the benefits of CPEC for Pakistan, but there is a very little academic discussion on how it strategically benefits China, which is its main financier. Therefore, the study contributes to research on China's geopolitics reorientation in general and the transformation of spaces through economic development for strategic gains in particular.

Keywords: gateway state, Indian Ocean Region, Belt and Road Initiative, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Pakistan, China.

Corresponding Author: Geetha Govindasamy, Senior Lecturer, Department of East Asian Studies, University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; email: geethag@um.edu.my

This article is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution License (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>)

中巴经济走廊：中国通往印度洋地区的门户

摘要：

中巴经济走廊（中巴经济走廊）是中国“一带一路”倡议（一带一路）的旗舰项目，连接中国喀什和巴基斯坦瓜达尔。本文分析了中国打算通过中巴经济走廊将巴基斯坦转变为通往印度洋的门户的原因。通过对专家的非结构化访谈和考察中巴经济走廊下的项目以及权力与空间之间的动态互动，本文发现，一旦成功完成，中巴经济走廊将成为中国减少其在印度洋地区脆弱性的门户。同时，预计中巴经济走廊将把中国这个腹地国家转变为印度洋地区的常驻大国，从而挑战印度洋的“封闭地缘政治空间和战略性”。关于中巴经济走廊对巴基斯坦的好处的文章很多，但关于它如何从战略上使作为其主要资助者的中国受益的学术讨论却很少。因此，该研究有助于研究中国地缘政治的总体重新定位，特别是通过经济发展实现空间转型以获得战略收益。

关键词： 门户国家，印度洋地区，一带一路，中巴经济走廊，巴基斯坦，中国。

1. Introduction

Many of the world's leading economies rely on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as a trading and energy lifeline. China does not have geographical proximity to the Indian Ocean but depends on the IOR for its trading and energy needs and security considerations (Ward, 2017). China pays special attention to the IOR, a trading passage for its energy imports (Zhu, 2019). Given the importance of the IOR and China's lack of overland access to the region, this geographical limitation compels Beijing to establish its footprints in the region. Given the influence of extra-regional power such as the United States (US) in the region, China's vested interest in the region is vulnerable to threat in times of any conflict. Furthermore, Chinese interests have assumed a global dimension; therefore, Beijing needs to overcome all the potential bottlenecks in the IOR to sustain its economic stature. In doing so, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), one of China's flagship projects under the larger Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), aims to obtain overland access to the IOR, which will transform the centuries-old enclosed strategic nature of the Northern Indian Ocean. As a result, China will also become a resident power in the IOR.

The CPEC is designed to connect the landlocked western Xinjiang province of China with the coastal port city of Gwadar in southern Pakistan (Figure 1). During a visit to Islamabad, the idea for an economic corridor was proposed by Chinese Premier Li Keqiang in May 2013. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif, signed a Memorandum of Understanding on CPEC on July 5, 2013. However, according to the former CPEC Project Director, Hassan Daud Butt (2016–19), the corridor only materialized two years later when the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, visited Islamabad in April 2015 (Personal communication, 2019).




Figure 1. CPEC and the Indian Ocean (Nadeem, 2018)

2. Background

This paper focuses on the impact of geographical location on strategic relations. The main focus of contemporary critical geopolitical theorists, such as Dodds (2007), Tuathail and Agnew (1992), was on the representational aspect of international power relations and discursive construction of geographical space. However, the current article has adopted a different angle, examining the dynamic interactions between power and space as first explored by Cohen (2015). Specifically, the article hones in on changes in geographical constraints that affect this interaction. Cohen (2015) argues that geopolitics is the "analysis of the interaction between, on the one hand, geographical settings and perspectives and, on the other, political processes. The settings are further composed of geographical features, patterns, and the multilayered regions they form. On the other hand, the political processes include forces that operate at the international and domestic levels, whereby the latter influences the former. Geographical settings and political processes are dynamic and influence each other." Under China's gigantic BRI and its proposed overland pathways (corridors) through Pakistan and Myanmar, the IOR will no longer be an enclosed geopolitical space, especially to

Beijing. Therefore, these corridors will change the strategic nature of the IOR, and they would also potentially turn Pakistan and Myanmar into "gateway" territories linking the Eurasian hinterland to the Indian Ocean.

Gateway territories play an important role in facilitating the movement of people, goods, and ideas and linking different parts of the world. According to Cohen (2015), gateway territories are located at key access routes, possess highly specialized natural or human resources, lack self-sufficiency (depend on other countries for trade), and rely on capital flow and technical know-how for growth. In this regard, Pakistan is strategically located in addition to possessing abundant natural resources; however, due to a lack of capital and technical know-how, the country is unable to exploit these advantages. Therefore, China intervenes, which has embarked on a strategy to transform Pakistan into a gateway territory via CPEC to secure its interests and overland access to the IOR. When CPEC is completed, it is expected to provide Pakistan with much-needed infrastructure and access to energy needs with Chinese funding.

Pakistan through CPEC plays a key role in China's geopolitical ambitions. The CPEC is an important project as it allows China to access sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the IOR which connects to financially strong economies in Asia. The space between the Indian Ocean and the Eurasian hinterland states, such as China, Russia, and Central Asia, faces several geographical constraints that make them inaccessible to the IOR via land. Furthermore, the IOR has restricted maritime access into the region. Due to these geographical challenges, the Indian Ocean has witnessed the dominant role of extra-regional strategic actors, such as Portugal in the 15th century, Britain in the 19th century, and the United States in the late 20th century. These strategic actors have not only kept the Indian Ocean as a strategically closed space, but they also prevented major Eurasian states, namely China and Russia, from access to the IOR (Brewster, 2017). Imperial Britain, for example, prevented Russian attempts to construct a railroad across Persia to Bandar Shahpur's port (now Bandar Khomeini) on the Persian Gulf (Kemp & Harkavy, 1997).

The IOR also contains critical chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. During times of conflict, such chokepoints make oil tankers vulnerable to attack, in addition to constant threats of piracy, terrorism, and crashes that contribute to catastrophic petroleum spills (Metelitsa & Mercer, 2014). Consequently, the state that influences and has a vested interest in these chokepoints will have strategic benefits. The successful completion of the CPEC is a priority in China's foreign policy and economic considerations. It will provide China with the most direct and shortest land route to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, making it less vulnerable to threats to

its economic activities in the IOR.

This article has four parts. The first part discusses CPEC investments and projects, while the second analyzes China's strategic interests and vulnerabilities in the IOR. The third part examines CPEC as a gateway to the IOR, while the last part examines challenges related to the CPEC and their long-term implications for its main financier.

3. The CPEC Project

The CPEC is a US\$46 billion (raised to USD 62 billion in 2017) project for building a vast network of railways, highways, airports, oil and gas pipelines, fiber optics and creating multiple economic zones (Ngeow et al., 2018). Currently, the CPEC passes through the Khunjerab Pass in northern Pakistan, and it is a 3000-kilometer-long communication and energy infrastructure network (Ali, 2016). The investments under CPEC can be divided into three broad sectors: the energy sector, which receives the lion's share of the investments, followed by the infrastructure sector and the building of Gwadar Port. Table 1 lists the number of projects in each sector and its estimated cost.

Table 1. Number of Projects and Estimated Cost under CPEC (CPEC Authority, 2022)

Sectors	Number of Projects	Estimated Cost (USD Million)
Energy	21	33,793
Infrastructure	8	9,784
Gwadar Port	9	44,401
Total	38	44,401

4. China's Strategic Interests in the IOR

The Chinese economy witnessed remarkable growth at nearly 10 percent annually for three decades due to the 1978 reforms and the country's liberalization policy. China has the world's second-largest economy, and its interests have assumed global dimensions concerning its growing economy. The nation's growth is driven by its huge domestic market and increased foreign investments and trade. The uninterrupted supply of energy resources mainly from external sources, namely the Middle East and Africa, is vital in China's impulse to be a global leader. China must maintain its economic growth momentum to maintain its position as a rising global power. To this end, the country has to protect its external energy and material resource supply chains, which mainly lie beyond its western and southern boundaries. Therefore, it is clear that China's engagement in the IOR is directly related to its domestic and foreign needs.

There are a few reasons for this. First, China's growing domestic energy demand has made it dependent on oil and gas supplies from the Middle East, especially from Saudi Arabia and Iran (Kaplan, 2011). Therefore, its strategic interests in the IOR are directly connected to the protection of SLOCs, particularly its energy transport.

The most important SLOCs for China extend from the Strait of Hormuz at the southern tip of the Persian Gulf, around the Indian subcontinent, to the Bay of Bengal and pass through the Straits of Malacca. Equally, the Southern African and Suez SLOCs across the Indian Ocean are vital for Chinese trade and to secure its energy supplies. Therefore, China needs to protect the SLOCs around the southern Eurasian Rimland — the eastern coast of Africa to the Indonesian archipelago.

Second, China is vulnerable to chokepoints in the IOR as it has very few entry points, and the vast distance between them makes the ocean largely enclosed. Hence, competition among great powers for the control of entry points, ports, and chokepoints in the IOR is commonplace. Currently, China has no influence over these chokepoints or the ports between them. Furthermore, 82 percent of the nation's energy supply passes through the Straits of Malacca, and in the event of any conflicts, its competitors may block this chokepoint (Brewster, 2015). Hence, it is not surprising that the Chinese President, Hu Jintao, labels the blockade threat as the Malaccan Dilemma. A similar threat has led to the Hormuz Dilemma, where 40 percent of China's oil imports in the IOR can potentially face this blockade.

Third, there is a very limited overland link between China and the Indian Ocean. The nation is vulnerable as its trade with Europe and the Middle East passes through the Indian Ocean, skirting the Indian subcontinent from west to east and transiting Southeast Asia before landing at the Chinese ports facing the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, access to the IOR is crucial for China's external trade interests. Additionally, this newly created Indo-Pacific concept excludes and threatens Beijing's trading and security interests in the IOR. According to Professor Hoo Ke Ping (Personal communication, 2020), an independent analyst in Malaysia, the concept "is a military alliance to surround China." Hoo's remarks are based on active US military and naval engagement in the IOR, especially with India, which suggests that Washington opposes the single-power hegemony of the Indo-Pacific region. Correspondingly, China's strategy is to counterbalance excessive Indo-US influence in the IOR, part of the Indo-Pacific region, by promoting projects in gateway territories, such as Pakistan and Myanmar. The reaction by Chinese scholars and media on the growing Indo-US partnership reveals China's concerns. Dao (2015) believes that the US perceives the "Chinese dragon" and the "Indian elephant" as natural rivals. Hence, he urges both countries to join forces for regional stability to counter US influence in the IOR. It is hardly surprising that the Chinese government uses BRI to reduce its vulnerabilities in the IOR. These include projecting naval and air power by gaining greater access to the South Asian ports for its naval vessels and developing overland transport links to the Indian Ocean via CPEC and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC).

5. CPEC—Shortest Route for China to Access Middle Eastern Oil

World's Top Exports statistics show that, in 2018, China's total oil imports were USD 239.2 billion, and almost half of this share (44.1 percent) was from nine Middle Eastern states (Workman, 2019). Given that China has been the world's biggest net oil importer since 2017, it is expected that the oil demand will increase due to its economic development and industrial needs. However, distance to the Middle East is a cause for concern as its oil reserves are located 12,537 miles away from China, and the supply routes pass through the IOR and Straits of Malacca. Hence, Gwadar can be viewed as a "gateway territory," a transitional zone allowing a shorter connection between the oil-rich region and China. When the CPEC is completed, the distance between these two regions will be dramatically shortened to 2,295 miles through an overland route from Gwadar Port to Kashgar to the eastern coast of China (Chang & Khan, 2019). The maritime route to transport oil and gas will also be shortened to six days compared with the current 32 days. In addition, CPEC would offer the shortest route for importing oil and gas to China even when compared with the proposed Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC), which is expected to shorten transport time to 19 days (Shaikh et al., 2016).

The CPEC will be successful when the northern part of Pakistan, which consists of the Karakoram Highway (KKH), is connected to the southern city of Gwadar. It will connect the western province of Xinjiang to the Indian Ocean via a proposed network of gas and oil pipelines, along with planned highways and high-speed rail infrastructure. The former CPEC Project Director, Hassan Daud Butt (Personal communication, 2019), confirmed that the extension of the KKH is underway. For example, the Multan-Sukkur section of the Karachi-Lahore motorway, which is 392 km, has been completed. Simultaneously, the Havelian-Thakot section of the KKH Phase 2, which is 120 km, has been 100 percent completed.

Furthermore, the Eastbay expressway in Gwadar, which connects with the existing Mehran coastal highway, is now operational. Once this entire connectivity infrastructure is completed, Gwadar is expected to be the center for the CPEC project. China will benefit from the CPEC as it will reduce the distance for Chinese oil imports and decrease its transportation costs. For instance, the cost of a 40-foot container from Abu Dhabi to Shanghai is expected to go down from USD 2,000 to USD 200–250 (Chang & Khan, 2019).

6. Safeguarding Sea Lines of Communications

The idea of gateway territories is conceived in the

context of power and space (Cohen, 2015). As explained in the preceding section, China's current maritime limitations to the IOR make it rather vulnerable to other powers. Therefore, China views CPEC as a key strategy to regain its land, maritime power, and space in the IOR to overcome maritime bottlenecks and chokepoints and influence maritime space. By 2011, China had become the world's largest energy consumer. Furthermore, the Chinese energy consumption profile corresponds with its rapid industrialization (Li et al., 2019). Any disruptions to the energy supply will result in a fuel shortage, severely affecting China's economic development. Consequently, the top priority for Chinese policymakers is the diversification of energy routes (Marantidou, 2014). Therefore, China's quest for alternative routes under BRI in the form of CPEC is pivotal to its energy security. Based on China's security calculus, it faces three vulnerable chokepoints in accessing its energy supplies. The first is the Gulf of Aden, exposed to piracy threats. The second is the Strait of Hormuz, which lies next to Iran, which could be easily blocked in a conflict between Iran and Washington (Cordesman, 2007). The third chokepoint is the Straits of Malacca, the shortest route between India and the Pacific Ocean. Each year, the route sees nearly 100,000 vessels, a large number of them being crude oil carriers (Calamur, 2017). Beijing has been justifiably cautious about any form of bottlenecks since 82 percent of its oil supply comes through the Straits of Malacca (Brewster, 2015). The CPEC was born of Beijing's dire need to keep these chokepoints free of trappings. China is also interested in extending the proposed Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline to China (Guo et al., 2019). The Iran-Pakistan-China pipeline (IPC) is expected to pass through Gwadar, which will give China access to Iranian natural gas. Simultaneously, oil imports from the Middle East can be unloaded at Gwadar Port and then carried through the pipelines to China. Hence, the full materialization of IPC and CPEC will ensure Beijing has overcome its vulnerabilities. It is noteworthy that China is not only considering the Gwadar-Xinjiang energy corridor, but it is also actively engaged in an energy corridor through Myanmar. To obtain access to the Bay of Bengal and avoid the Straits of Malacca for direct energy imports, China is developing a southern corridor, the Kyaukpyu-Yunnan route, which is a deep water port at Kyaukpyu (Myanmar) and parallel oil and gas pipelines to China's Yunnan province, costing more than USD 2.5 billion. The transport capacity of this gas pipeline is expected to be 12 billion cubic meters per annum (Beining, 2017), while that of the oil pipeline is estimated to be 12 million tonnes. Although the Gwadar-Xinjiang pipeline and the Kyaukpyu-Yunnan route will not transport the entire energy supplies needed by China, they would serve as an alternative route to provide a steady flow of energy in times of conflict.

Major powers, such as the US, India, and Japan,

strongly influence the IOR (Wang, 2015). The US, for example, has launched anti-piracy operations in the IOR, while India has built naval bases on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. China's role in ensuring the security of the IOR is relatively limited, though it has become its largest stakeholder in terms of relying on the sea lines of communications for its energy imports. China realizes that this free ride in the IOR may not last long. Therefore, acquiring vital port facilities in the region through the BRI will allow Beijing to safeguard its free access to the IOR further. Dr. Li Mingjiang (Personal communication, 2020), an Associate Professor at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, observed that, "in times of possible future conflicts, China could even use Gwadar as a naval facility, if necessary." Moreover, Chinese trade is vulnerable to conventional and non-conventional threats in the IOR. Therefore, the strategic location of Gwadar Port allows the Chinese navy to position itself in the event of a conflict (Rahman & Shurong, 2017). Furthermore, Dr. Li Mingjiang (Personal communication, 2020) notes that, due to the growing New Delhi-Washington strategic ties, the location of Gwadar will allow Beijing to keep an eye on Indo-US activities in the IOR. The port of Gwadar is vital to China's maritime security as it has only one naval base outside the country, which is in Djibouti, Africa (Al Jazeera, 2017).

7. The Development of Xinjiang

Despite China's export-oriented economic success in the last four decades, uneven development has created enormous economic disparities between the eastern coastal and interior regions. According to Julie Yu-Wen (Personal communication, 2020), Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Confucius Institute at the Faculty of Arts, University of Helsinki (Finland), "China is using overseas investment and cooperation to boost domestic economic growth and development. These investments are also intended to secure the overland linkage between its unstable region of Xinjiang and neighboring countries". Therefore, the CPEC is expected to decrease the disproportionate development across China. The uneven economic development across China is due to establishing industries in the eastern coastal cities for export facilitation purposes. For example, in 2018, the per capita disposable income in Xinjiang, an interior region, was USD 3,188 (China Daily, 2019), while the eastern coastal city of Shanghai had a per capita disposable income of USD 9,520 (Chen, 2019). Hence, China launched economic initiatives to develop the autonomous region of Xinjiang. Under the nation's 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), Xinjiang is the focus where initiatives were implemented to develop it into an important gateway to connect the country with Western, Central, and South Asia.

This linkage is expected to transform Xinjiang into a

gateway to export machinery and finished goods via CPEC and China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor to reach the markets of Central and South Asia. Additionally, Xinjiang will utilize the same corridors to import raw materials and energy to drive the region's economic growth. Therefore, the Xinjiang region has become crucial in ensuring the success of CPEC. The early success of the CPEC is evident from its first shipment of seafood via its western route to Xinjiang from the Indian Ocean. Reports suggest that goods sold were 10% cheaper in Xinjiang than in China's eastern coastal cities (Jingjing, 2017).

8. Challenges to CPEC

CPEC is China's best initiative to provide quick access to SLOCs and act as a gateway to the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf for its risk-free oil transportation. Despite this, the implementation of CPEC is plagued by various challenges related to the project's geographical setting and political processes.

8.1. Security Shortfalls

Overall security shortfalls related to CPEC are worrying. The project faces two major security risks: the unstable political climate in Baluchistan and domestic and global Islamist militancy in Pakistan and China (Sial, 2014). Since Gwadar Port is crucial to CPEC's success, the ongoing insurgency in Baluchistan has become a major concern (The Economist, 2015). Since the inception of Pakistan in 1947, the relationship between the ethnic Baloch and the central government has been conflictual. Chief among the reasons is that, despite being rich in energy and mineral sources, with a strategically well-positioned location, Baluchistan remains the least developed region in Pakistan, in addition to having the lowest level of literacy and disposable income. As a result of being socially and politically marginalized, economically exploited, and militarily oppressed, Baluchistan has seen several armed uprisings against Islamabad. The Baloch extremist organizations, such as Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF), consider CPEC as a threat, namely in changing the demographics of the province, which will further marginalize the locals (Baloch, 2016). Again, the general perception among the nationalists in Baluchistan is that Islamabad is Punjabi-dominated. The fear of Punjabi expansionism and exploiting the resources available in that province through the CPEC is a real concern for the hinterland regions. Therefore, there is growing fear among the nationalist parties that the project will serve the interests of Islamabad with very little benefit for the marginalized regions. Hence, opposition toward the CPEC has witnessed a few untoward incidents; for example, in November 2018, Baluch militants attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi (Biberman & Schwartz, 2019), and, in May 2017, two

Chinese language teachers in Quetta were kidnapped (Xinhua, 2017). Islamabad is also concerned with Pakistani-based Islamic militants who might jeopardize the progress of CPEC by carrying out attacks on Chinese nationals and Pakistani workers in Baluchistan. While the Pakistani Taliban, or Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), has not yet specifically threatened the CPEC, the organization has targeted other well-known government and military installations to inflict economic losses (Hassan, 2016). Hassan Daud Butt (Personal communication, 2019) opines that the central government does not view Islamic militants as a threat. However, the government remains vigilant, he asserts. It has established a separate security division and set up a special task force to specifically address any security concerns related to CPEC projects.

In addition, the northern route of the CPEC from Pakistan's Gilgit-Baltistan region, which passes through China, can potentially become a battleground for the militant groups. The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) is a Uighur separatist group reported to be re-organizing in Afghanistan's Badakhshan province, part of the Wakhan Corridor and Dir and Chitral districts in Pakistan. Badakhshan is strategically located at the edge of the Wakhan Corridor, which provides the only access for China into Afghanistan. In 2018, as many as 250 TIP militants were present in Badakhshan, while around 60 were based in Dir. Hence, it is hardly surprising that China is building a military base in Badakhshan (Basit, 2018) to launch attacks on Uighur militants in this region. In 2016, China detained 50 Uighur women married to Gilgit-Baltistan residents on suspicions of having links with the TIP. Two years later, in April 2018, Pakistani security agencies arrested another 48 TIP militants from the Gilgit-Baltistan area. It is believed that these militants entered Pakistan via Afghanistan (Basit, 2018).

The Chinese government faces challenges from multiple fronts in developing the CPEC. Domestic insurgencies, such as the Uighur militancy and global Islamist networks, have become major concerns, especially in the northern route of the CPEC. Despite these challenges, the CPEC is vital for China's future growth and its long-term geopolitical interests in the IOR. Since the CPEC is the flagship of the BRI, the Chinese government will strive to carry on with the project despite facing challenges. According to Hassan Daud Butt (Personal communication, 2019), at the request of the Chinese government, Pakistan has set up a special force of 10,000-people security personnel along the routes of the CPEC to ensure successful completion of the venture.

8.2. Geopolitical Challenges

Currently, the CPEC is equally vulnerable to geopolitical insecurities in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Given the recent fall of Kabul at the hands of the Taliban, there are concerns about CPEC's becoming a

victim of insurgency emanating from the potential joining forces of the Taliban groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Chinese government planned to expand the CPEC westward, which directly involved going into Afghanistan (The Economic Times, 2018). Since regional stability is the key to the successful implementation of the project, the Chinese government is actively engaged with Taliban leaders to maintain peace and stability in the region. Suppose indeed the westward expansion of the CPEC materializes. In that case, it can be argued that there will be development, prosperity, and an improvement in state-to-state relations in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.

Geopolitical realities also dictate the extent to which Pakistan's neighbors view CPEC. Thus far, India is the only neighbor that has been hostile to the corridor. When CPEC was initiated in 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi deemed it unacceptable because several infrastructure projects traverse Gilgit-Baltistan, which is part of the disputed territory of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Since India claims Gilgit-Baltistan, this is an encroachment of the Indian Territory and perceived as a threat to its sovereignty. At present, Gilgit-Baltistan is a semi-autonomous region administered by Pakistan. However, India is worried that Islamabad may absorb or annex this region constitutionally by making it its fifth province. In India's view, it would be an uphill battle to challenge the legality of CPEC if Pakistan grants Gilgit-Baltistan a constitutional status.

Indian policymakers also perceive Chinese expansionism through CPEC as one strategy to contain India in South Asia. Against this backdrop, India perceives the CPEC as a long-term Chinese strategy to counter and contain growing Indian influence in Afghanistan, Iran, and the CARs. China's active engagement in South Asia is evident with the construction of Gwadar Port, Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong Port in Bangladesh. The People's Liberation Army Navy's new strategy of combining 'offshore defense waters' with the protection of 'open seas' and the possibility of positioning these ports as future naval outposts cause further concern for India (Hali et al., 2015). India has responded by developing Chabahar Port in Iran as a counterbalance to Gwadar Port. More recently, its attempt to destabilize the CPEC can be seen via the activities of India's Kulbhushan Yadav (viewed as a spy by Pakistan), operating in Baluchistan and Karachi. In his testimony at Pakistan military court in 2016, Yadav admitted to providing support to Baloch separatists to carry out attacks in Baluchistan and Karachi. Yadav was reported to have distributed USD 40,000 to recruit and train militants and purchase weapons and explosive materials to attack Chinese nationals and companies working on CPEC projects (Basit, 2018).

In sum, the relentless Indo-Pakistan rivalry has led to mounting tensions that potentially can derail the progress

of CPEC.

9. Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on CPEC

The outbreak of COVID-19 has massively disrupted the world's social, political, and economic structure. Not surprisingly, the rapid spread of coronavirus cases across the globe has raised concerns over the success of BRI projects. Being a key member state of BRI, Pakistan has witnessed the spread of coronavirus on a large scale, resulting in a strict lockdown to manage the pandemic.

Understanding the implications in delaying projects, Imran Khan called a meeting of the National Coordination Committee (NCC) on April 2, 2020, to oversee the COVID-19 situation and its impact on the economy in general and CPEC projects in particular (Ali, 2020). The NCC decided that CPEC projects should continue so as not to delay further its completion as scheduled. While normal flight operations between China and Pakistan were suspended amid the COVID-19 pandemic, special chartered flights were arranged to bring Chinese technicians to CPEC sites (The Express Tribune, 2020b). These actions reflect the intensity of commitment and determination of China towards CPEC.

Further, the bilateral relations between the two states have strengthened during the pandemic. For instance, representatives from both countries signed two hydropower generation projects reportedly worth USD 3.9 billion under CPEC (Fazl-e-Haider, 2020). Additionally, President Arif Alvi signed another memorandum of understanding with China to enhance cooperation in agriculture, education, technology, and health care under the realm of CPEC during his visit to Beijing in March 2020 (The Express Tribune, 2020a). Overall, such bilateral engagements amid COVID-19 confirm the importance of CPEC and the extent to which both Beijing and Islamabad are committed to implementing the related projects.

10. Conclusion

Throughout history, the IOR has remained a source of competition among great powers because it facilitates global trade across the region. Due to a lack of overland and maritime connectivity, the Eurasian hinterland states like China have not acquired a resident power status in this region. As a result, the IOR has always been dominated by extra-regional powers. As Cohen (2015) argues, some states and regions facilitate exchanging ideas, goods and people-to-people contact. He contends that by developing physical linkages between two spaces, states or regions can be altered into gateways. This physical linkage between China's hinterland and the IOR is evident from the development of CPEC. Given the nature of the CPEC, this study found that the geographical barriers that have kept China out of the IOR

are not permanent and are subject to changes in infrastructure development. Through the CPEC, it is evident that hinterland states can be transformed into coastal gateways. China's huge investments in infrastructure projects under the CPEC will eventually allow it to construct an overland path to the IO. More significantly, when completed, the project will provide an oceanic front to the landlocked western province of China. Therefore, CPEC is expected to bring both strategic and economic benefits for China. The CPEC will mitigate China's vulnerabilities in the IOR. The newly established direct access will provide alternative routes for Beijing to avoid critical chokepoints, secure passage, be more cost-effective, and provide the shortest route for importing energy and goods.

The literature available on the CPEC has mostly examined the project's economic benefits for Pakistan and China. Limited studies have examined the CPEC project in the context of gateway states. By transforming Pakistan into a gateway state through the CPEC, IOR's centuries-old enclosed strategic nature will be opened up for China to enhance its presence in the IO. Resultantly, by positioning itself at Gwadar, China would potentially mitigate the influence of extra-regional powers in the IOR.

The construction of Gwadar Port will enable Beijing to check on the energy supplies passing from the Strait of Hormuz and monitor India's naval activities in the IOR. In so doing, the region will become more securitized and may lead to a possible conflict. The potential growing influence of Beijing in the Arabian Sea may also ignite tensions in the region between India-Pakistan and India-China. Therefore, Pakistan should respond sensibly to Chinese funding under the CPEC and make sure that the use of Gwadar port by China shall be limited only to commercial purposes.

In sum, the CPEC project holds a significant position in China's geopolitics and security calculations. Undoubtedly, the completion of CPEC can make China an Indian Ocean power. However, as an ongoing project, the successful completion of the CPEC has many limitations. Any setback in the CPEC may confront China with threats to energy imports for its industries, hinder the development of the Xinjiang region, and increase the time and cost of imports that pass through the IOR.

References

- [1] ALI, A. (2016). China Pakistan Economic Corridor: Prospects and Challenges for Regional Integration. *Arts and Social Sciences Journal*, 7(4), 1000204. <https://doi.org/10.4172/2151-6200.1000204>
- [2] ALI, I. (2020). *Impact of Covid-19 on CPEC*. Modern Diplomacy. Retrieved from <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/06/15/impact-of-covid-19-on-cpec/>
- [3] AL JAZEERA. (2017). *China Opens First Overseas Base in Djibouti*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/8/1/china-opens-first-overseas-base-in-djibouti>
- [4] BALOCH, S. (2016). *China-Pakistan corridor: Tightening noose around Baloch aspirations*. Indian Defence Review. Retrieved from <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/china-pakistan-corridor-tightening-noose-around-balochi-aspirations/>
- [5] BASIT, A. (2018). *Why Attacks on Chinese Interests in Pakistan Will Continue*. South China Morning Post. Retrieved from <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2175238/attacks-chinese-nationals-and-interests-pakistan-are-likely>
- [6] BEINING, Z. (2017). *Spotlight: China-Myanmar Oil, Gas Project Benefits Both*. Xinhua. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/10/c_136272395.htm
- [7] BIBERMAN, Y., & SCHWARTZ, J. (2019). *China and Pakistan Have Struck a Devil's Bargain with Militants*. Foreign Policy. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/05/china-and-pakistan-have-struck-a-devils-bargain-with-militants/>
- [8] BREWSTER, D. (2015). An Indian Ocean Dilemma: Sino-Indian Rivalry and China's Strategic Vulnerability in the Indian Ocean. *Journal of the Indian Ocean Region*, 11(1), 48-59. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2014.994822>
- [9] BREWSTER, D. (2017). Silk Roads and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of China's New Pathways in the Indian Ocean. *Geopolitics*, 22(2), 269-291. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1223631>
- [10] CALAMUR, K. (2017). *High Traffic, High Risk in the Strait of Malacca*. The Atlantic. Retrieved from <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/strait-of-malacca-uss-john-mccain/537471/>
- [11] CHANG, Y.-C., & KHAN, M.I. (2019). China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Maritime Security Collaboration: A Growing Bilateral Interests. *Maritime Business Review*, 4(2), 217-235. <https://doi.org/10.1108/MABR-01-2019-0004>
- [12] CHEN, C. (2019). *Shanghai Residents Top Nation in Disposable Income*. China Daily. Retrieved from <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/21/WS5c6e65eba3106c65c34eaa0a.html>
- [13] CHINA DAILY. (2019). *Xinjiang Residents' per Capita Disposable Income Rises*. Retrieved from <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/02/WS5c554be5a3106c65c34e7f6d.html>
- [14] COHEN, S.B. (2015). *Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- [15] CORDESMAN, A.H. (2007). *Iran, Oil, and the Strait of Hormuz*. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from

- <https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-oil-and-strait-hormuz>
- [16] CPEC AUTHORITY. (2022). Retrieved from <http://cpec.gov.pk/>
- [17] DAO, W. (2015). *India, China Mustn't Fall into Trap of Rivalry Set by the West*. Global Times. Retrieved from <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/903927.shtml>
- [18] DODDS, K. (2007). *Geopolitics: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- [19] FAZL-E-HAIDER, S. (2020). *The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor*. Jamestown. Retrieved from <https://jamestown.org/program/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/>
- [20] GUO, F.-F., HUANG, C.-F., & WU, X.-L. (2019). Strategic Analysis on the Construction of New Energy Corridor China–Pakistan–Iran–Turkey. *Energy Reports*, 5, 828–841. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egy.2019.06.007>
- [21] HALI, S.M., SHUKUI, T., & IQBAL, S. (2015). One Belt and One Road: Impact on China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. *Strategic Studies*, 34(4), 147–164. Retrieved from <https://issii.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Shafei Moiz and Tan and Sumera 3435 SS 41 20142015.pdf>
- [22] HASSAN, S.R. (2016). *To Protect Chinese Investment, Pakistan Military Leaves Little to Chance*. Reuters. Retrieved from <https://uk.reuters.com/article/pakistan-china-security-gwadar-idUKKCN0VH06F>
- [23] JINGJING, M. (2017). *China-Pakistan Economic Corridor aims to boost trade between two countries*. Global Times. Retrieved from <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1032560.shtml>
- [24] KAPLAN, R.D. (2011). *Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power*. New York: Random House.
- [25] KEMP, G., & HARKAVY, R.E. (1997). *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East*. Washington, District of Columbia: Brookings Institution Press.
- [26] LI, M., LI, L., & STRIELKOWSKI, W. (2019). The Impact of Urbanization and Industrialization on Energy Security: A Case Study of China. *Energies*, 12(11), 2194. <https://doi.org/10.3390/en12112194>
- [27] MARANTIDOU, V. (2014). *Revisiting China's 'String of Pearls' Strategy: Places 'with Chinese Characteristics' and Their Security Implications*. Pacific Forum CSIS. Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182061/140624_issuesin_sights_vol14no7.pdf
- [28] METELITSA, A., & MERCER, M. (2014). *World Oil Transit Chokepoints Critical to Global Energy Security*. US Energy Information Administration. Retrieved from <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=18991>
- [29] NADEEM, M. (2018). *Is Gwadar the Answer to China's Malacca Dilemma?* Retrieved from <https://gwadacentral.com/is-gwadar-the-answer-to-chinas-malacca-dilemma/>
- [30] NGEOW, C.-B., MAHESAR, P.A., & ROGERS, R.A. (2018). In Praise of China: China in the Eyes of Pakistani Diplomats. *International Journal of China Studies*, 9(3), 285–302. Retrieved from <https://icsum.org.my/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/IJCS-9-3-2Ngeow Pervaiz Roy-for-website.pdf>
- [31] RAHMAN, S.U., & SHURONG, Z. (2017). Analysis of Chinese Economic and National Security Interests in China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under the Framework of One Belt One Road (OBOR) Initiative. *Arts and Social Sciences Journal*, 8(4), 1000284. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/2151-6200.1000284>
- [32] SHAIKH, F., JI, Q., & FAN, Y. (2016). Prospects of Pakistan–China Energy and Economic Corridor. *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, 59, 253–263. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.12.361>
- [33] SIAL, S. (2014). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: An Assessment of Potential Threats and Constraints. *Conflict and Peace Studies*, 6(2), 11–40. Retrieved from <https://pakistanhouse.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/cpec.pdf>
- [34] THE ECONOMIC TIMES. (2018). *China and Pakistan Decide to Extend CPEC towards Afghanistan*. Retrieved from <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-and-pakistan-decide-to-extend-cpec-towards-afghanistan/articleshow/65754550.cms>
- [35] THE ECONOMIST. (2015). *Pakistan and China: Dark Corridor*. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/asia/2015/06/04/dark-corridor>
- [36] THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE. (2020a). *Covid-19 Impact on CPEC within Controllable Range*. Retrieved from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2214906/2-covid-19-impact-cpec-within-controllable-range>
- [37] THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE. (2020b). *Pakistan, China Urge United Global Response to COVID-19*. Retrieved from <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2178216/1-beijing-reaffirms-support-kashmir-president-alvi-visits-virus-hit-china>
- [38] TUATHAIL, G.Ó., & AGNEW, J. (1992). Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy. *Political Geography*, 11(2), 190–204.

- [https://doi.org/10.1016/0962-6298\(92\)90048-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0962-6298(92)90048-X)
- [39] WANG, L. (2015). Sea Lanes and Chinese National Energy Security. *Journal of Coastal Research*, 73, 572–576. <https://doi.org/10.2112/SI73-099.1>
- [40] WARD, J.D.T. (2017). The Emerging Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean Region. *Asia Pacific Bulletin*, 386. Retrieved from <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb386.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=36149>
- [41] WORKMAN, D. (2019). *Top 15 Crude Oil Suppliers to China*. World's Top Exports. Retrieved from <http://www.worldstopexports.com/top-15-crude-oil-suppliers-to-china/>
- [42] XINHUA. (2017). *Pakistan Confirms Death of 2 Kidnapped Chinese Nationals*. Retrieved from http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/30/c_136715642.htm
- [43] ZHU, C. (2019). *India's Ocean: Can China and India Coexist?* Singapore: Springer. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5726-7>
- 参考文献:**
- [1]阿里, A. (2016年)。中巴经济走廊：区域一体化的前景与挑战。艺术与社会科学杂志, 7(4), 1000–204. <https://doi.org/10.4172/2151-6200.1000204>
- [2]阿里, 一 (2020)。新冠肺炎对中巴经济走廊的影响。现代外交。取自 <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/06/15/impact-of-covid-19-on-cpec/>
- [3]半岛电视台。(2017)。中国在吉布提开设第一个海外基地。取自 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/8/1/china-opens-first-overseas-base-in-djibouti>
- [4]俾路支, S. (2016年)。中巴走廊：围绕俾路支的愿望收紧绞索。印度国防评论。取自 <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/china-pakistan-corridor-tightening-noose-around-balochi-aspirations/>
- [5] BASIT, A. (2018)。为什么对中国在巴基斯坦利益的攻击将继续。南华早报。取自 <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2175238/attacks-chinese-nationals-and-interests-pakistan-are-likely>
- [6]贝宁, Z. (2017年)。聚焦：中缅油气项目双赢。新华网。取自 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-05/10/c_136272395.htm
- [7] BIBERMAN, Y. 和 SCHWARTZ, J. (2019)。中国和巴基斯坦与武装分子达成了魔鬼交易。对外政策。取自 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/05/china-and-pakistan-have-struck-a-devils-bargain-with-militants/>
- [8]布鲁斯特, D. (2015年)。印度洋困境：中印竞争与中国在印度洋的战略脆弱性。印度洋地区杂志, 11 (1), 48–59. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19480881.2014.994822>
- [9]布鲁斯特, D. (2017年)。丝绸之路与珍珠串：中国在印度洋新路径的战略地理。地缘政治, 22 (2), 269–291. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1223631>
- [10]卡拉穆尔, K. (2017年)。马六甲海峡的高交通，高风险。大西洋组织。取自 <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/strait-of-malacca-uss-john-mccain/537471/>
- [11] CHANG, Y.-C., & KHAN, M.I. (2019)。中巴经济走廊和海上安全合作：日益增长的双边利益。海事商业评论, 4(2), 217–235. <https://doi.org/10.1108/MABR-01-2019-0004>
- [12]陈C. (2019)。上海居民可支配收入居全国首位。中国日报。取自 <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/21/WS5c6e65eba3106c65c34eaa0a.html>
- [13]中国日报。(2019)。新疆居民人均可支配收入增加。取自 <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201902/02/WS5c554be5a3106c65c34e7f6d.html>
- [14]科恩, S.B. (2015年)。地缘政治：国际关系地理学。兰纳姆：罗曼和利特菲尔德。
- [15]考德斯曼, A.H. (2007年)。伊朗、石油和霍尔木兹海峡。战略与国际研究中心。取自 <https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran-oil-and-strait-hormuz>
- [16] 中巴经济走廊当局。(2022年)。取自 <http://cpec.gov.pk/>
- [17] DAO, W. (2015)。印度，中国绝不能落入西方设下的竞争陷阱。环球时报。取自 <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/903927.shtml>
- [18] DODDS, K. (2007)。地缘政治：非常简短的介绍。牛津，纽约：牛津大学出版社。
- [19] FAZL-E-HAIDER, S. (2020)。新冠肺炎大流行对中巴经济走廊的影响。詹姆斯敦。取自 <https://jamestown.org/program/the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/>
- [20] GUO, F.-F., HUANG, C.-F., & WU, X.-L. (2019)。中国—巴基斯坦—伊朗—土耳其新能源走廊建设战略分析。能源报告, 5, 828–841. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egy.2019.06.007>
- [21] HALI, S.M., SHUKUI, T., & IQBAL, S. (2015)。一带一路：对中巴经济走廊的影响。战略研究, 34 (4), 147–164。取自

- https://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Shafei_Moiz_and_Tan_and_Sumera_3435_SS_41_20142015.pdf
- [22] 哈桑, S.R. (2016年)。为保护中国投资,巴基斯坦军方几乎没有机会。路透社。取自 <https://uk.reuters.com/article/pakistan-china-security-gwadar-idUKKCN0VH06F>
- [23] 晶晶, M. (2017)。中巴经济走廊旨在促进两国之间的贸易。环球时报。取自 <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1032560.shtml>
- [24] 卡普兰, R.D. (2011)。季风:印度洋和美国力量的未来。纽约:兰登书屋。
- [25] 肯普, G., 和哈卡维, R.E. (1997)。战略地理和不断变化的中东。华盛顿哥伦比亚特区:布鲁金斯学会出版社。
- [26] LI, M., LI, L. 和 STRIELKOWSKI, W. (2019)。城市化和工业化对能源安全的影响:以中国为例。能源, 12 (11), 2194。 <https://doi.org/10.3390/en12112194>
- [27] MARANTIDOU, V. (2014)。重温中国的“珍珠链”战略:“有中国特色”的地方及其对安全的影响。太平洋论坛CSIS。取自 https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/182061/140624_issuesin_sights_vol14no7.pdf
- [28] METELITSA, A. 和 MERCER, M. (2014)。对全球能源安全至关重要的世界石油运输阻塞点。美国能源信息署。取自 <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=18991>
- [29] NADEEM, M. (2018)。瓜达尔是中国马六甲困境的答案吗?取自 <https://gwadarcentral.com/is-gwadar-the-answer-to-chinas-malacca-dilemma/>
- [30] NGEOW, C.-B., MAHESAR, P.A. 和 ROGERS, R.A. (2018年)。赞美中国:巴基斯坦外交官眼中的中国。国际中国研究杂志, 9 (3), 285-302。取自 https://icsum.org.my/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/IJCS-9-3-2Ngeow_Pervaiz_Roy-for-website.pdf
- [31] RAHMAN, S.U. 和 舒荣, Z. (2017)。“一带一路”框架下中国在中巴经济走廊(CPEC)中的经济和国家利益分析。艺术与社会科学杂志, 8(4), 1000284。 <http://dx.doi.org/10.4172/2151-6200.1000284>
- [32] SAIKH, F., JI, Q., & FAN, Y. (2016)。巴中能源与经济走廊的前景。可再生能源和可持续能源评论, 59, 253-263。 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.12.361>
- [33] SIAL, S. (2014)。中巴经济走廊:潜在威胁和制约因素评估。冲突与和平研究, 6 (2), 11-40。取自 <https://pakistanhouse.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/cpec.pdf>
- [34] 经济时报。(2018年)。中巴决定将中巴经济走廊延伸至阿富汗。取自 <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-and-pakistan-decide-to-extend-cpec-towards-afghanistan/articleshow/65754550.cms>
- [35] 经济学家。(2015年)。巴基斯坦和中国:黑暗走廊。取自 <https://www.economist.com/asia/2015/06/04/dark-corridor>
- [36] 特快论坛。(2020a)。新冠肺炎在可控范围内对中巴经济走廊的影响。取自 <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2214906/2-covid-19-impact-cpec-within-controllable-range>
- [37] 特快论坛。(2020b)。巴基斯坦和中国敦促全球联合应对新冠肺炎。取自 <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2178216/1-beijing-reaffirms-support-kashmir-president-alvi-visits-virus-hit-china>
- [38] TUATHAIL, G.Ó., & AGNEW, J. (1992)。地缘政治与话语:美国外交政策中的实用地缘政治推理。政治地理学, 11 (2), 190-204。 [https://doi.org/10.1016/0962-6298\(92\)90048-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/0962-6298(92)90048-X)
- [39] 王丽 (2015)。海上航道与中国国家能源安全。海岸研究杂志, 73, 572-576。 <https://doi.org/10.2112/SI73-099.1>
- [40] 沃德, J.D.T. (2017)。印度洋地区的新兴地缘政治。亚太公报, 386。检索自 <https://www.eastwestcenter.org/system/tdf/private/apb386.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=36149>
- [41] WORKMAN, D. (2019)。中国前15大原油供应商。世界顶级出口产品。取自 <http://www.worldstopexports.com/top-15-crude-oil-suppliers-to-china/>
- [42] 新华。(2017)。巴基斯坦确认两名被绑架的中国公民死亡。取自 http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-10/30/c_136715642.htm
- [43] 朱C. (2019)。印度的海洋:中印能否共存?新加坡:施普林格。 <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-5726-7>