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The Ottoman-German Political Stance on the Great Arab Revolt (1908-1918): A study through the Egyptian Press

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Abstract:

The Arab countries were under Ottoman rule from 1517 until the First World War (1914). During this period, the Arabs were subjected to persecution and oppression, especially in the Hijaz and the Levant, where the Turks implemented a policy of Turkification to subjugate the Arabs. However, the Arabs resisted this policy and sought to escape Ottoman rule. After Turkey joined the Axis Powers alongside Germany in the First World War, the suffering of the Arabs increased because of this alliance. Consequently, Sharif Hussein bin Ali and his sons adopted the idea of Arab nationalism and unity to confront the Turks, and they declared a revolt against Turkish rule in the Hijaz. The Arab army, led by Prince Faisal bin Hussein, joined the British army to liberate the Levant. These events led to political stances from the German and Ottoman allies. This study aimed to clarify the impact of the German-Ottoman alliance on Arab relations in the coalition. Additionally, this study highlights the role of this anti-Arab alliance in the emergence and development of the Arab nationalist movement against the Turkish colonizer. This study is new in its subject matter because most of the research on the history of the Great Arab Revolt has focused solely on the causes, events, outcomes, and Arab and British reactions to the revolt, without addressing the opposing stance of the German-Ottoman alliance.

Keywords: Ottomans; Germans, revolution, Sharif Hussein, Hijaz, political stance.

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奥斯曼帝国和德国对阿拉伯大起义（1908-1918）的政治立场：通过埃及媒体进行的研究

摘要：

阿拉伯国家从 1517 年到第一次世界大战（1914）一直处于奥斯曼帝国的统治之下。在此期间，阿拉伯人遭受迫害和压迫，尤其是在希贾兹和黎凡特地区，土耳其人实施了土耳其化政策来征服阿拉伯人。然而，阿拉伯人抵制这一政策，并试图逃离奥斯曼帝国的统治。在土耳其与德国一起加入轴心国参加第一次世界大战后，阿拉伯人的苦难因这一联盟而加剧。因此，谢里夫·侯赛因·本·阿里和他的儿子们采取了阿拉伯民族主义和团结的思想来对抗土耳其人，他们宣布反抗土耳其在希贾兹的统治。由费萨尔·本·侯赛因王子领导的阿拉伯军队加入了英国军队，解放了黎凡特。这些事件导致了德国和奥斯曼帝国盟友的政治立场。本研究旨在阐明德奥斯曼联盟对联盟中阿拉伯关系的影响。此外，本研究还强调了反阿拉伯联盟在阿拉伯民族主义运动反抗土耳其殖民者兴起和发展中所发挥的作用。本研究的主题新颖，因为大多数关于阿拉伯大起义历史的研究只关注起义的原因、事件、结果以及阿拉伯和英国对起义的反应，而没有涉及德国-奥斯曼联盟的反对立场。

关键词： 奥斯曼帝国；德国人、革命、谢里夫·侯赛因、希贾兹、政治立场

1. Introduction

The Arab countries have been under Ottoman rule since 1517, and Ottoman rule was maintained until the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Ottoman policies toward the Arab world, particularly the Hijaz and the Levant, were characterized by oppression and injustice against the Arabs. Young Unionists, members of the Committee of Union and Progress, who received their education in Germany and were saturated with racist ideas about the subjugation under Ottoman rule, intensified these policies. Turkey's alliance with Germany during the First World War from 1914 to 1918 also resulted in political and military cooperation between Turkey and Germany. Consequently, the Unionist Turks' policy aimed at perpetuating Turkish domination over Arab countries, necessitating the adoption of a policy of Turkification, that is, Arab societies should adhere to Turkish policies, speak the Turkish language, and follow Turkish customs and traditions. However, the Arab reaction was a complete rejection of this policy, striving to rid themselves of Turkish rule and refusing to succumb to the injustices inflicted upon them by Unionist Turks.

During this time, the Hashemite Sharifs ruled the Hijaz, led by Sharif Hussein bin Ali and his sons, who were the first Arabs and Muslims to adopt the idea of Arab nationalism and unity among the Arab nation. They recognized the danger of the Arab lands continuing under Unionist Turkish rule and their refusal to submit to the oppression they were subjected to by the Turks. They were also aware of the crimes committed by the Unionists against the Arabs in Syria and Iraq, their attempts to eradicate the Arabic language, Turkify Arab elements, and undermine Islam and faith by insisting that the Arab caliph must be from among Arab Muslims

and not Turks. Therefore, Sharif Hussein and his sons endeavored to rid themselves of the idea of loyalty and subjugation to the Unionist government, leading them to declare a revolt against Turkish rule in the Hijaz. The Arab army, led by Prince Faisal bin Hussein, joined the British army to liberate the Levant from the Turks and Germans, exploiting the events of the First World War.

Undoubtedly, Sharif Hussein's revolt against the Turks in the Hijaz and his sons' advance to the Levant to expel the Ottomans resulted in political stances against the German and Ottoman allies.

From this standpoint, this article addresses the topic of the Ottoman-German political stance on the Great Arab Revolt and the declaration of the Faisal government in Damascus, 1916-1918: a study through the Egyptian press. In this context, the Egyptian media focused on the Great Arab Revolt and political developments and trends between the Arab and Turkish parties. Critical newspapers such as *Al-Muqattam*, *Al-Ummah*, *Al-Ahram*, *Mir*, and *Al-Manar* continuously covered political developments.

This paper raises several questions: Did Sharif Hussein initiate this revolt because of the strained relations between him and the Unionists? What was the problem with the concept of the Great Arab Revolt with the Turkish government and its Unionist leaders? Did the Ottoman press focus on the declaration or use a media blackout policy? What was the stance of the German government toward the Unionists' policies regarding the revolt? Did the two states recognize it? What was the reaction of the Unionist Turks and German allies to the declaration of the Faisal government in Damascus? Did the Germans and Turks resist the Egyptian and British army's creep toward Syria?

To answer these questions, the research addresses several axes to tackle the issues and questions, including the first axis: the Ottoman political stance toward revolt, the evolution of the relationship between Sharif Hussein and the Ottomans from 1908 to 1915, the Ottoman media blackout policy toward revolt, and the problem of the Ottoman Sultan's isolation of Sharif Hussein from the Sharif of Mecca. Additionally, it examines the German government's stance on the Unionists' policy toward revolt and the impact of the Ottoman stance on the political, religious, and cultural elites of the Arab countries under Ottoman rule.

2. Ottoman Political Stance toward Arab Revolt

Egyptian newspapers addressed the Arab revolt, its background, causes, the evolution of the relationship between Sharif Hussein and the Ottomans from loyalty to tension, confrontation, and rebellion against them. This was done by analyzing the historical context of political events from 1909 to 1915, the period in which the Unionists began to dominate the Ottoman state, especially politicians and Arab intellectuals who witnessed the atrocities and crimes committed by the Unionists in Syria and Lebanon against Arab nationalists.

2.1. Sharif Hussein's Relationship with the Ottomans

From Loyalty to Confrontation: It seems that from a long time ago, Sharif Hussein bin Ali harbored hatred and resentment toward the Ottoman government's actions in Arab territories. However, like other Arab leaders, he believed that reforming Unionist policies might be possible through advice and guidance. Despite this, Sultan Abdul Hamid fully understood that Sharif Hussein had intentions and desires for Arab independence from Ottoman rule (IOR/L/MIL/17/16/13), 05 June 1916-1918). Sultan Abdul Hamid attempted to avoid this by summoning Sharif Hussein to Astana under the pretext of serving the state and the Sultan. Therefore, he was appointed as a member of the State Council. This is what the Sultan publicly declared, while the primary purpose of summoning Sharif Hussein to Astana was to exclude him from the Hijaz and banish him from it due to Sharif Hussein's opposition to the central governance policy followed by the Ottoman government in its administration of its provinces (Burj, 1989: 199). Consequently, Sharif Hussein's residence in Astana from 1892 to 1908 was involuntary, as Prince Abdullah ibn Hussein recounted in his memoirs that his residence in Istanbul was forced and coerced. Still, it was a period of learning and growth (Ben Al-Hussein, 1989: 19).

Despite the Ottomans appointing Sharif Hussein in the Sharifate of Mecca, he and his sons never submitted

to the Unionist Turkish policy toward the Arabs. Rashid Rida responded to his critics by supporting Sharif Hussein and his policy in an article entitled: "Sharif Hussein's Loyalty to the Ottoman State," explaining that Sharif Hussein and his sons did not support the Unionists, nor did they endorse the injustices and oppression perpetrated by their association against Arabs (IOR/L/PS/10/615,1916. P.26). Instead, they supported the state itself in its decision, recognizing its importance, even if it did so against the Arabs. Consequently, they distinguished between the state itself and the Unionists and their policies, believing that the optimal approach to the Ottoman state's policy to address what they saw as harmful actions was through persuasion and striving to convince them of the harm of their actions and the benefit of their benefit (Al-Manar, 1916: 19). It seems that this direction and approach were not satisfactory for all Arab political parties. Still, they believed that Sharif Hussein, as the Prince of Mecca, must be loyal to the state and support it only in executive matters, and what did not reach the implementation stage should be opposed by his party against the Unionists after their nationalistic bias emerged. Their oppression of the Arabs became obvious (Al-Manar, 1916: 152).

One of the Arab nationalists in *Al-Muqattam* newspaper presents a meticulous analysis of the beginning of the evolution of the relationship between Sharif Hussein and the leaders of the Arabian Peninsula on one side and the Unionists on the other through an article titled "How the glory of the Arabs is restored to a scholar among Muslim scholars." They argued that Sharif Hussein and his supporters in the Arabian Peninsula grew weary of the oppressive policies practiced by the Unionist Association in governing the Arabs. Consequently, Arab leaders convened in 1909 to discuss the situation and the state of their countries. They unanimously agreed that if they continued on this path for years, the Arabs would lose their identity and Arabic because of the practices of the Unionists. Thus, their idea of independence would be destroyed. In 1911, they rallied around several demands related to the appointment of Arab judges, or at least those who understood the Arabic language to adjudicate Arab issues. However, the response from the Chamber of Deputies concerned the appointment of judges who did not know Arabic. The reaction of the Chamber of Deputies was to appoint Muhammad Effendi Tawfiq as judge of Asir, Sheikh Zakir Effendi as judge of Tail, and Ahmed Safwat as judge of Hodeida. What is interesting is that not all of them knew Arabic. The second demand, establishing a particular administration for collecting tithes and taxes, was rejected (Al-Muqattam, 1916a: 1).

This incident marked the beginning of Sharif's policy shift from absolute loyalty to the Ottoman state to a state of tension. Sharif Hussein described Arab countries as sick and full of wounds, each different in character.

Thus, his vision coincided with that of the gathering, where he realized the stark truth without blemish. They acknowledged that if they persisted in this situation for a few more years, the idea of their independence would die along with their hopes for progress and reform in the Arab lands (Al-Muqattam, 1916b: 1).

It seems that the policy of the Ottoman state toward the Arabs and of Sharif Hussein began by relieving on division and discord among the Arabs, thus creating a basis for conflict. Hence, Astana sparked the dispute, and the division among the princes of the Arabian Peninsula sought to prevent their unity. They began to differentiate between Ibn Rashid and Ibn Saud on the one hand and between Imam Yahya and Sayyid Al-Idrisi on the other. The aim was to eliminate some of them and their nationalist demands (Al-Muqattam, 1916b: 1).

The author of the article summarizes this by stating that the policy of division, which was the policy of Abdul Hamid, was one of the most vital reasons for instigating hatred among Arab leaders. This policy has severely damaged them. The men of the Abdul Hamid era ignited the flames of discord among Arab leaders, aiming to annihilate each other so that they could rest from those who sought to break away from them (Al-Muqattam, 1916b: 2).

Another writer tries to confirm that despite the Unionists adopting this divisive policy, it did not affect the mindset of Sharif Hussein and the achievement of his goals aimed at freeing the Arabs from these Unionists, who were bloodshedder and plunderers of Arab wealth and resources. He says, "I used to see some people think that the Unionists could incite Yemeni leaders against the Sharif, but I excused them for their ignorance of the reality, which is that if there is resentment against the Unionists in the heart of the Sharif, then in the hearts of others in the Arabian Peninsula, there is a thousand times more resentment that has exceeded a limit where Tariq did not stand and did not leave among men a covenant" (Al-Muqattam, 1916b: 1).

There is another evidence of tension in the relationship between Sharif Hussein and the Ottomans when the Unionists attempted to provoke discord between them, portraying Hussein as incapable of protecting holy places and diminishing his prestige in front of Muslims. This happened when the Union and Progress Society tried to pressure Abdul Rahman Al-Yusufi, the heir of the Syrian Hajj, in 1909. They spread rumors that the Hajj route from Damascus to Medina was unsafe and thus saw the necessity of transferring pilgrims by sea from Jeddah to the shores of Syria. Sharif Hussein was aware of their intentions and rejected them, since this action implied his incapacity and failure to secure the Hejaz and the holy places and the loss of his religious prestige in front of the Muslims of the world. Consequently, the dispute ended with Sharif Hussein insisting on sending the Syrian caravan by the

route to Medina under his supervision and the leadership of his son Prince Abdullah (Saeed, 1980: 108).

In commenting on this incident, the Al-Ahram newspaper issued on October 3, 1916, cited what was published by the French newspaper *Le Temps* under the title "The Hajj of French Muslims." This article provides a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the Hajj situation before, during, and after Sharif Hussein's revolution. The newspaper also refuted the Turkish claims of Sharif Hussein's incapacity to strengthen security and protect holy places and pilgrims, as they had claimed before (Al-Ahram newspaper, 1916b: 4).

Another writer attempts to explain the main reason for the tension in the relationship between Sharif Hussein and the Ottomans: that Sharif Hussein never submitted to the policy of the Ottoman state and its men, whether during the Abdul Hamid era or during the Unionists. They could never have subdued the Arabs and Sharif Hussein. From the beginning, Sultan Abdul Hamid fully understood this, confirming that he did not extend the Hejaz railway to Medina except in anticipation of the Arabs rising one day and reclaiming holy places from the Turks again. He built this railway to achieve two goals: to transport troops quickly and in the most significant numbers. Second, the Hejazi lost the economic resources they obtained from transporting pilgrims and serving them, which they considered vital financial resources for the Hejazi tribes. Thus, the Hejazi constantly needed Ottoman assistance (Al-Ahram newspaper, 1916c: 1).

Notably, the relations between Sharif Hussein and the Turkish Unionists began to deteriorate severely and moved from a stage of tension to deal with the principle of political antagonism. At the beginning of the war, the Ottoman government began to try to attract Sharif Hussein. It sought his help by declaring in the Hejaz territories and sending its men to the campaign of Jamal Pasha the First to head toward Sinai on the eastern border. They began to shower him gifts and favors (Al-Muqattam, 1916d).

However, when the Ottoman Empire requested Sharif Hussein's participation in Jamal Pasha's campaign, he linked his participation to achieving several privileges related to the Arabs and the Hejaz. However, Anwar Pasha procrastinated with Sharif Hussein on this issue. The main reason behind Sharif Hussein's insistence on implementation was mainly because he demanded that he fully realized that the lands of the Hejaz were not threatened during the war. Rashid Rida pointed this out in an article titled "The Future of the Arabian Peninsula" in *Al-Manar*, stating that General Sir Maxwell, the British Commander-in-Chief in Egypt, issued a proclamation addressed to the Arabs of the Hejaz dated December 31, 1914, in which he stated: "His Majesty King George V, the King of England, has declared that no land or sea military action will be taken in the Arab lands or their ports unless there is a need to

do so to protect the Arabs from Turkish oppression” (Al-Manar Magazine, 1916b: 379).

The reality is that the Unionists began to doubt Sharif Hussein’s loyalty to them and their policies. Therefore, they devised a plan to eliminate Sharif and his sons. They attempted to start with Sharif Hussein by secretly sending Officer Waheb Pasha, one of the Unionist leaders, to the Hejaz. Upon arriving in Mecca, he revealed the official tradition that mandated his governance over the Hejaz and his leadership of its garrison. (Al-Manar, 1916c: 151). General Ghalib Pasha mentions in his memoirs the instructions given to Waheb Pasha: “We know that Sharif Hussein worked vigorously for the independence of the Arabs and the detachment of these lands from Ottoman rule.” Therefore, we intend to isolate him and appoint Sharif Ali Haydar. Upon your arrival in Mecca, you must create a dispute between the positions of governorship and emirate so that we can achieve the goal” (Al-Fawwaz, 1997: 170).

It seems that the English were aware of the Unionists’ intentions. Prince Abdullah bin Hussein recalled that when he met Kitchener in Cairo, he began to hint to Prince Abdullah that the British had learned that Turkey was on its way to making fundamental changes to Arab countries. He asked whether any change in the prince’s position would be acceptable to him. Prince Abdullah’s response was clever, coming from a politician who understood British cunning. He told Kitchener that the Sharif was an employee at the Sultan’s disposal, and it was within his right to replace him, and he would not oppose that (Ibn Hussein, 1989: 77).

In any case, Waheb Pasha began his work to implement his plan to remove Sharif Hussein, demanding that he hand over the military authority and a hundred rifles that his guards were armed with. However, Sharif Hussein refused, and with Waheb Pasha’s insistence and the Sharif’s determination to reject it, Turkish soldiers clashed with Sharif Hussein’s guards (IOR/L/PS/10/615, 1916, 26). This clash resulted in several casualties, leading people to believe that strife had ignited between the governorship and the emirate (Abu al-Majd, 1990: 652).

Ultimately, Sharif Hussein responded by joining Jamal Pasha’s first campaign in Sinai. He decided to accompany Prince Ali bin Hussein with the Waheb Pasha forces to participate in the Ottoman campaign in January 1915. Prince Ali led the Arab troops, while Waheb Pasha led the Turkish troops. During their march, Waheb Pasha’s documents fell from one of his followers, discovered by Prince Ali’s’ followers. Inside were correspondences between the Unionists and Waheb Pasha discussing the assassination of Sharif and his sons and the elimination of his idea of Hijazi independence. Consequently, Prince Ali refused to continue the campaign with Waheb Pasha and returned to Medina. (Abu al-Majd, 1990: 652). Then Prince Abdullah, the son of Hussein, traveled to Astana with these

documents. In the presence of Talaat Pasha and Anwar Pasha, he informed them of the contents of the documents. However, the Unionists persisted in trying to deceive Sharif Hussein and his sons when they removed Waheb Pasha and appointed Kamil Pasha in his place. This man united political and military power. This was to implement the plan that Wahib Pasha failed to implement, and this was confirmed by the fact that this governor accompanied seven military corps and an artillery corps while heading to Hejaz. (Al-Manar Magazine, 1916b: 379).

Rashid Rida affirms that despite the circumstances, the Sharif responded to the Ottoman Empire’s request for Arab assistance with soldiers in the Second Sinai Campaign. However, he noticed that while the Astana government requested Arab assistance for the campaign, Turkish troops were sent to the Hejaz in tens of thousands, stationed in its cities and passes. He knew that the Hejaz had no fear of Britain after the publication of Sir John Maxwell’s proclamation regarding the security of the Hejaz during the war. (Al-Manar Magazine, 1916b: 379). This confirms Sharif Hussein’s suspicions about Unionist’ intentions. He saw that the main motive behind the Ottoman Empire sending thousands of its soldiers to the Hejaz, despite their urgent need elsewhere, was to persecute the Arabs of the Hejaz and to harm them and their honor from the Hashemite family. This was done in fulfillment of the Committee on Union and Progress program. Therefore, Sharif Hussein refused to let the Arabs leave the Hejaz. The Hejaz campaign, initially formed as a response to Anwar Pasha’s request to fight alongside his troops in Sinai, turned into a campaign to besiege Ottoman soldiers in Medina after the announcement of the Arab Revolt. (Al-Manar Magazine, 1916c: 151).

Since then, the relationship between Sharif Hussein and the Ottoman Empire shifted from a state of loyalty to tension, eventually culminating in confrontation. Egyptian newspapers began addressing the critical question of why this relationship had evolved and deteriorated to such an extent through their articles and political analyses.

In this context, Al-Ahram published an essential article on July 8, 1916, titled “The Arab Revolt: Its Causes and Consequences - A Glimpse of Arab Revolutions History,” in which it asserted that Anwar Pasha and his colleagues sold the country to the Germans for gold and that German officers inherited the authority of the Turks. When the state was independent, it had sanctity for Muslims, but when it became a German colony, and its ministers followed Berlin’s orders, the state lost its power and position. The religious significance of this situation demanded Sharif Hussein’s disobedience and independence in the Hijaz. The article further elaborates by stating that Prince Aga Khan realized this consequence when he disseminated his famous proclamation to the Muslims of India and the

British colonies at the beginning of Turkey's entry into the war. The declaration stated that if Germany were to win the war, Turkey would become a German colony, and Emperor Wilhelm's deputy would become the true ruler of Turkey. Consequently, as Turkey demonstrated its recklessness and became a tool in the hands of the Germans, it not only destroyed itself but also lost the position it held as the guardian of Islam and its sanctity. (Al-Ahram r, 1916a: 1).

As the *Al-Muqattam* newspaper attempted to explain, the deterioration of that relationship to the point of confrontation and revolution was due to the political corruption of those holding power, the tyranny of rulers, the draining of the nation's wealth, burdening its sons with hard work, and closing the doors of livelihood in their faces. All these factors necessitated the stance of the Sharif of Mecca against them. (Al-Muqattam, 1916c: 5).

Although Sharif Hussein had devoted much time and effort to negotiation and advice, the Unionists had pushed him toward defying them and not submitting to their authority, a notion that had brewing for a long time. One Arab nationalist described this by saying that the idea was almost realized, but the outbreak of war prevented it. Nevertheless, it did not hinder its natural progression. Instead, it assisted in its manifestation through the hands of the Sharif of Mecca, a remarkable man capable of concealing his intentions and seizing the opportunity to fulfill them. (Al-Muqattam Newspaper, 1916c: 5).

Interestingly, the *Muqattam* newspaper published an article titled "The Independence of the Arabs," describing the evolution of this relationship from loyalty to confrontation and the declaration of revolution against the Ottomans. It characterized the policy of the Unionists as a disease and Sharif Hussein as the doctor, saying, "When the disease worsens, and danger looms, the doctor, a genius among the nation's geniuses, comes and revives the dying hopes, invigorates its strength with tonics, enriches it with the spirit of enthusiasm and nationalism" (Al-Muqattam, 1916b: 1).

2.2. The Concept of Revolution among Unionists and the Media Blackout

The concept of the Great Arab Revolt was one of the most critical issues facing the Ottoman government with regard to its political stance toward that revolution. Sometimes, they referred to it as the corruption of Mecca, as highlighted by the *Tasvir-i Efkar* newspaper, and at other times, they called it a local rebellion, as Jamal Pasha termed it. In Astana, as indicated by the *Maqtam* newspaper, the government, Turkish authorities, and their men were astonished and struck by the news like a thunderbolt, and the government was deeply concerned because this revolution aimed to defend the rights of its oppressed people.

Therefore, they tried to conceal it from the Turkish public, thinking of it as a rebellion that could be suppressed and eliminated before its danger became clear and its news spread. Consequently, Turkish statements throughout June continued to deny the existence of any revolution in the Hejaz, and there was no mention in Turkish newspapers until June 29, three weeks after the outbreak (Al-Muqattam, 1916e: 2).

Perhaps the Ottoman authorities began to emerge from their state of secrecy because of what the British Times newspaper published about the outbreak of the revolution. The *Al-Muqtam* newspaper conveyed an essential article from The Times titled "Talaat Pasha and Non-Turkish Elements," published in its issue dated June 20. It stated that Talaat Pasha, the Turkish Minister of the Interior, indicated in a conversation with the German ambassador in Astana that Sharif Hussein had committed nothing but a limited rebellion (Mansy, 1975: 318).

It appears that despite the policy of media blackout on the Arab revolution adopted by Unionist leaders, they could not conceal it and what was happening in the Hejaz from their allies in Germany and Austria. However, they politically attempted to downplay the significance of the Hejaz revolt. German and Austrian consuls visited Jamal Pasha in Damascus following the announcement of the rebellion and discussed it with him. He remarked that it was a minor uprising that could be quickly quelled; he said: "It's a simple local movement that won't last long. I've ordered my forces in the Hejaz to deal with it swiftly. I hope to inform you of its end and the capture of Sharif Hussein in a few days so that I can bring him here and hang him at the gates of Damascus" (Al-Muqattam, 1916f: 5). They left reassured by his words, believing him to be a responsible leader, and wrote to their respective governments what they had heard.

Al-Muqattam newspaper confirms what Jamal Pasha mentioned: that the government and Turkish authorities in Astana were alarmed by the Arab revolution and were deeply concerned. Therefore, orders were issued to send Ottoman soldiers to southern Palestine, and a significant campaign was planned for the Hejaz. However, the Arabs' destruction of the railways with dynamite from southern Ma'an to Medina prevented the Ottomans from benefiting by quickly closing off the ammunition and supplies needed by the Ottoman army (Mansy, 1975: 319).

It seems that after this visit, Jamal Pasha tried to indirectly explain to Turkey's allies that the attack and corruption in the Hejaz had occurred and that the Ottoman government was capable of eliminating it. At the same time, he continued the policy of media blackouts on Turkish people and public opinion. On June 15, a statement was issued from Damascus, stating that some gangs of greedy and corrupt elements and some Arabs, tempted by money, attacked nearby police

stations in Medina with weapons and destroyed the telegraph and railway. Therefore, military forces moved to crush these gangs on their way into town and managed to enter the city, beginning to repair the railway. They also established a wireless intelligence center in the town for intelligence gathering (IOR/L/MIL/17/16/13, 05 June 1916-1918).

In an attempt by Jamal Pasha to continue concealing the revolution from the Turkish public and portraying it as rebellion and disobedience, the statement did not mention the leader of the revolution, Sharif Hussein bin Ali. The statement is as follows "We received a telegram from Medina's governor expressing the great joy of the people of the blessed city for the reaction of the Turkish forces. Its text is as follows: "The people of the good city were greatly pleased by the elimination of the rebellious tribes and their punishment in the fierce battle that took place, and peace has returned to its lands" (Al-Muqattam, 1916e: 1).

At the same time, Jamal Pasha attempted to deceive his allies and maintain media silence on the Hejaz Revolt; keeping it hidden from the Turks, he ordered Fakhri Pasha to fight Sharif Hussein and his forces. He also commanded some military divisions and units stationed in Damascus to travel to the Hejaz and join Fakhri Pasha's forces. Politically, Jamal Pasha formed a delegation composed of Muhammad Fawzi Al-Azm, Abdul Rahman Al-Yusuf, and Sheikh Asaad Shukri to travel to Medina to meet tribal leaders and persuade them to remain loyal to the Ottoman state and join its armies in an attempt to win them over.

In another attempt by the Ottoman government to pit Arabs against each other and incite division among them, the Ottoman Sultan issued an imperial decree on July 12, 1916, dismissing Sharif Hussein without giving any reason for his dismissal and appointed Sharif Ali Haidar, who was a deputy of the Ottoman Senate and a former Minister of Awqaf, as the new Prince of Mecca. He was sent by special train from Constantinople to Damascus and then to Medina (Saeed, 1980: 158).

One report from the US Embassy explained this by stating that news of the Arab revolt was initially just rumors until it was confirmed by the appointment of Sharif Ali Haidar, a member of the Senate, as the new Prince of Mecca. The report continues about the Turkish government's stance, noting that the new Prince left Astana for his post, surrounded by many fanfare, and Turkish newspapers periodically announced his arrival in various cities along the route (Mansy, 1975: 320).

2.3. Impact of the Ottoman Stance on Elites in Turkish-Controlled Countries

Having examined the Ottoman state's political stance toward the Great Arab Revolt, we now turn to studying its effect on political, religious, and cultural elites in countries under the rule of the Turkish Unionists. We aimed to answer a crucial question: What was the

position of Arab politicians, intellectuals, and religious scholars during Ottoman rule? Did they reject the revolution to support the Ottomans, or did they agree with Sharif Hussein and his revolt?

In reality, the desire of most Arab princes in the Arabian Peninsula aligned with Sharif Hussein's wish to rid themselves of Unionist' oppressions. These princes had repeatedly tried to overthrow Turkish rule in the Arabian Peninsula. However, they failed because of the discord and disunity fostered by the Unionists' policy of sowing division and strife among them. Consequently, the idea of independence found acceptance, approval, and encouragement from Arab princes (Al-Muqattam, 1916b: 1). The presence of Turkish armies in the Ottoman Arab territories prevented Arabs from joining the military forces, thus hindering any potential uprising or revolution. Ultimately, Arab leaders and princes agreed on the necessity of rallying around Sharif Hussein bin Ali, a leader among the Arabs free from Turkish and foreign control. Thus, Sharif Hussein's call for independence and revolt against the Turks was met with approval and relief (Al-Muqattam, 1916g: 1).

Arabs were deeply resentful of the Unionist policies toward them, feeling exploited and unjustly treated by the Turks. *Al-Muqattam* Newspaper quoted an Arab nationalist saying, "The Turks view the Arabs as a milking cow or as the sun that burns itself to illuminate those who burned it." However, they did not submit but agreed that the leadership should be taken over by wise men who understood that the Unionist' policies would only lead to the disintegration of the Islamic community and sought independence from the Turkish Unionist state (Al-Muqattam, 1916g: 4).

3. German Position on the Revolt and Unionist Policy toward it

The Turkish-German alliance prompted the Egyptian press, particularly *Al-Muqattam* and *Misr* newspapers, to monitor the European stance in general and the German stance in particular regarding the Great Arab Revolt. They explored German-Turkish relations and Germany's policy toward the Arab world by analyzing the historical context of the period preceding the Arab Revolt—a time when Germany sought to expand eastward. This examination perhaps aimed to answer an important question: why did the news of the Great Arab Revolt strike the Germans like a thunderbolt? Alternatively, it would pave the way for discussing the German position on the revolt.

Al-Muqattam newspaper quoted the British *Daily Mail* as discussing Germany's objectives in allying with Turkey, stating that German advocates aimed to extend Germany's economic policy in the East. Germany sought from its relationship with Turkey only economic control over the countries under its dominion, needing

Turkey's resources such as cotton, wool, oil, and coastal ports (Al-Muqattam, 1916i: 1). The newspaper suggested that had Turkey understood Germany's true intentions, it would not have rushed into war with Germany. Turkey expected from its ally a consolidation of its authority and the restoration of its lost prestige from the Tripoli and Balkan Wars (Al-Ahram, 1916d: 1).

Al-Ahram discussed what American writer Mr. Lewis Freeman wrote about the Arab Revolt, noting that German political strategist Bismarck devised Germany's famous plan under the slogan "Drive to the East." His successor, Emperor Wilhelm, sought to implement this plan, primarily aiming to control the lands and populations under Ottoman rule. He attempted to seize 800,000 square miles of Turkey's Asian territories through an alliance with Turkey. The Balkan Wars benefited him as they paved the way for Berlin to link with Bagdad. Wilhelm tried to deceive the Arabs by courting Islam and pretending to be a protector of Muslims, sending emissaries to all Islamic regions to give the impression that he had converted to Islam and performed the pilgrimage (Al-Ahram, 1916e: 4).

In implementing Bismarck's plan to control the Arab world, Emperor Wilhelm fully realized that England was the only obstacle to Germany's global domination, particularly over Turkey's Arab territories. Bismarck devised his eastern plan accordingly, and Wilhelm began executing it by trying to stir Muslim sentiments against the British. They propagated numerous rumors about British oppression of Muslims. They even depicted British officers beating Muslims in India to incite Muslims against the British (Al-Ahram, 1916f: 1).

One of Al-Ahram's writers, he posed an essential question: Did German influence succeed in controlling the Arab countries under the Turkish Unionist government? Did the Germans achieve Bismarck's plan? Did Emperor Wilhelm succeed in deceiving Arabs by courting Islam?

In this context, the newspaper indicates that Arab Muslims perceived the Turks and their German allies as working toward the extermination of the Arab and Armenian races, which deeply distressed them. The result was that the Arab revolt against the Turks was a decisive blow to the German influence that Wilhelm had sought to establish among the Arabs with all his might. He spared no effort in extending his influence and asserting control over them. This revolt marked Germany's most significant failure, as it proved to them that Arab Muslims were too wise and astute to be deceived by German government tricks or to sacrifice themselves for it. The wise men of the Arabs, led by the Sharif of Mecca, had been monitoring the rise of German policy in Turkey and the growing influence of Germany in recent years, knowing full well that such influence was short-lived.

The newspaper pointed out that the most significant aspect of Sharif Hussein's actions was as much a

challenge to the Germans as to the Turks. The Arabs had endured Turkish oppression for years, but they could not tolerate German tyranny for even two years. They rose to overthrow their yoke and eradicate their influence. The writer of the article expressed amazement, stating that the surprising thing was not that the Arabs were now attacking the Germans but rather that they had not done so earlier (Al-Ahram, 1916f: 4).

The critical question arises: What political stance was Germany toward the Great Arab Revolt? What was their position on their Turkish allies' policies and revolt itself? In reality, the revolt had a painful impact on the Germans because their cherished sympathy for Islam and its support for them vanished completely (Al-Ahram, 1916e: 1). Simultaneously, upon hearing of the revolt, the Austrian government felt deceived by its adherence to Germany, realizing the turmoil in the Ottoman territories, with Arabs calling for independence, echoed by Syrians. The Arab Revolt affected the Ottoman state and necessitated reconsidering their alliances with the Turks and Germans (Al-Ahram, 1916a: 4).

In this context, the German and Austrian consuls visited Jamal Pasha in Damascus following the revolt's announcement and discussed it with him. He remarked that a minor uprising could be quickly quelled (Saeed, 1980: 164).

Notably, when telegraphs relayed news to Europe about the independence of Hejaz and Sharif Hussein's expulsion of Turkish forces from Jeddah, Mecca, Taif, and Lith, European newspapers covered the revolt and its events, except for the German and Austrian press, which were instructed to remain silent about this movement (Al-Ahram, 1916g: 1).

It appears that the news of Sharif Hussein's revolt against the Turks severely impacted the German government, which was shocking because it threatened their Turkish Unionist allies in Arab lands. Consequently, the Egyptian *Al-Muqattam* newspaper reported from the British Times news of Germany's media blackout policy on the Arab revolt, prohibiting their newspapers from even mentioning Sharif Hussein's revolt in Hejaz (Al-Muqattam, 1916j: 1). Politically, they tasked the Ottoman ambassador in Berlin to request his government to send detailed information about Sharif Hussein and his revolt (Al-Ahram, 1916h: 3).

The announcement of the revolt and its coverage in the international press compelled Germany to acknowledge it as a reality. Politically, Germany, alongside Turkey, attempted to spread slander, rumors, and discord, vainly accusing France of severe oppression in North and West Africa and striving to control the Arab East by supporting Sharif and his revolt. Sometimes, they insinuated that England was behind the revolt but with an Islamic veneer (Al-Muqattam, 1916k: 1).

German policy toward the Unionists seemed to change as some German newspapers started writing about the revolt, suggesting that the events in Hejaz were a natural outcome of Turkish policy. *Al-Muqattam* published and analyzed an essential article by German journalist Johann Tao in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, pointing out two points: First, the writer's frankness in a German newspaper with strict censorship in a country allied with Turkey. Second, the writer's comments on Anwar, Jamal, and Talaat's preoccupation with atrocities and crimes against the Arabs (Al-Muqattam, 1916k: 1).

Notably, Sharif Pasha, an opponent of the Unionists and their policies, stated in an article in the *Matin* newspaper on June 21st: "The Hejaz revolt is a severe blow to The Committee of Union and Progress and its allies, forewarning the disintegration of the empire, which is a natural consequence of the methods of injustice and oppression practiced by the ruling clique toward the empire's communities and peoples" (Al-Ahram, 1916g: 1).

The researcher observes that the Germans began to lose faith in their Turkish allies regarding the suppression of Sharif Hussein's revolt, especially after the spread of the uprising and its events. Consequently, the Germans realized their influence in Turkey was primarily due to financial support they had provided to the members of the Committee of Union and Progress. They also recognized that their policies, which relied on economic incentives, had no lasting impact and that a power base built on such foundations could not endure long (Al-Ahram, 1916e: 1).

In this context, *Al-Muqattam* published an important article, quoting *The British Times*, on Germany's preparations. The article highlighted the Germans' determination to control Turkey with an iron grip, ensuring that it would not slip from their grasp (Al-Muqattam, 1916l: 1). Amin Said confirmed this by stating that the moral impact of the revolt on the Germans exceeded its material effect. Some of their leaders in Damascus reportedly said the following: "We did not win over the Turks, nor did we endure what we did for them, except because they hold the Islamic Caliphate and are respected by Muslims worldwide as the descendants of one of the greatest houses in Islam." The Germans began reconsidering their relationship with the Turks, aiming to distance themselves from them (Said, 1980: X).

German policy toward the Turks and their failure to quell Sharif Hussein's revolt intensified the rift between German and Turkish soldiers. After months of fighting together, the initial camaraderie and sympathy turned into discord and conflict. An Arab nationalist who visited Syria after the outbreak of the Arab revolt noted that Aleppo and Syria were filled with German officers, many of whom were returning to Germany rather than heading toward Syria (Al-Muqattam, 1916l: 1).

On August 4, 1916, the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Muqattam* published a significant article attacking German policy titled "The Germans: Enemies of Islam." The article stated that henceforth, Muslims could only harbor hatred and resentment toward the Germans, as they showed no regard for sacred values or innocent nations in the pursuit of their goals (Al-Ahram, 1916h: 3).

The Arab perception of the Germans and their Turkish allies, alongside the Germans' view of their allies' military and political collapse, was highlighted in a British intelligence report. Maurice, a British intelligence officer, visited Berlin and Syria before heading to Aqaba. He reported that the Germans were making strenuous efforts to reconcile the Arabs and the Turks. They even established the Arab Affairs Office under Yelderren's leadership in Damascus, indicating that their efforts were not entirely in vain (IOR/L/Mil/17/16/13, summary of The Hejaz Revolt, General Staff, War Office, 1918).

4. The Ottoman and German Political Stance on the Entry to Damascus and the Declaration of the Faisal Government There

The truth is that the victories achieved by the Arab and British forces against the Ottoman and German troops caused political shocks for the Germans and Ottomans. It seems that Syria and Palestine were of strategic importance to the warring nations. The Turks acknowledged their defeat, leading to a meeting of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate in Astana, chaired by the Ottoman Sultan, to discuss the political and military situation of the Ottomans in the Arab lands. *Al-Muqattam* newspaper reported excerpts from the Sultan of Turkey's speech, where he said that the fall of Damascus, Beirut, and other parts of Greater Syria, and the decimation of three large Ottoman armies, left them no choice but to cease the war. He added, "As the Sultan of Turkey, I have sent the Grand Vizier to ask Talat Pasha to seek peace from Dr. Wilson" (Al-Muqattam, 1918a: 3).

Al-Muqattam also reported on what German newspapers published in an article titled "The German Peace Initiative: Turkey Follows Its Ally," stating that on October 8, the paper indicated that Turkey had no military response to the fall of Damascus and the Syrian cities. Instead, they accepted the reality and sought the same path as their allies, Germany and Austria (Al-Muqattam, 1918b: 1).

The newspaper tried to interpret the Ottoman political stance toward Syria's fall and its capture by the Arabs and the British. It pointed out that those following the news of the clashes between the Turks and Germans in Damascus and elsewhere in Syria, with a high number of Germans killed, would conclude that the Turks had grown weary of their German allies and their arrogance

and dominance. If the Sultan of Turkey and Talat Pasha could rid themselves of the German threat in the Ottoman capital, it was likely, if not certain, that they would hasten to make peace with the Allies on whatever terms were required (Al-Muqattam, 1918c: 3).

Interestingly, *Al-Muqattam* reported on November 30, 1918, that Turkey had requested Germany to hand over Talat and Jamal Pasha as war criminals (Al-Muqattam, 1918d: 1). The paper did not provide any explanations regarding this news. The researcher believes that if this news is accurate, it might indicate that Talat and Jamal Pasha refused to acknowledge their defeat in the Allies and rejected seeking peace with them or accepting the terms they might impose on Turkey. Therefore, they sought refuge with Germany, their ally.

The British and their Allies were aware of anticipated that the military defeat of the Germans and Ottomans in Palestine and Syria would also lead to political defeat. They expected Turkey and Germany's political stance to follow their military stance, leading them to exit the war and seek peace with Britain and its Allies. This was evident from the telegram of Monsieur Dieter Vitch, the British squadron commander, to General Allenby in Alexandria, who said, "Please accept my sincere congratulations on the brilliant victories you have achieved. These victories, which took place simultaneously in Palestine, Syria, and Macedonia, point to significant outcomes and will shake the Germanic and Turanian union, with two of its members soon exiting the war (Al-Ahram, 1918: 3).

5. Deposition of Sharif Hussein

Rashid Rida attempts to explain the deposition of Sharif Hussein and the appointment of Sharif Haidar as a decision by Anwar Pasha, noting that Sharif Haidar was not loyal to the Arabs but to the Committee of Union and Progress, their puppet. In an article published on August 29, 1916, titled "Opinions of the Elite on the Arab Question and Arab Independence in the Hejaz," Rida stated that Anwar Pasha visited Syria and the Hejaz earlier that year to personally oversee the dispatch of troops and weapons to the Hejaz to eliminate the nobility there. It was said that he brought his puppet, Sharif Haidar, from Astana to Syria and then to Medina to succeed Sharif Hussein as the Amir of Hejaz (Al-Manar, 1916d: 150).

Rashid Rida suggests that the Ottoman government's objective with this decision was to create divisions and discord among the leaders of the Arabian Peninsula, causing them to weaken each other's political and military fronts, making it easier for the Turks to suppress the revolution and eradicate the idea of Hejaz's independence from the Ottoman state. Rida wrote that if this news was accurate, they would use one leader against another to seek the ensuing chaos they desired. If Sharif Haidar and his brother Sharif Jaafar could rally some Arabs of Hejaz with state funds to support their

influence, it would make it easier for the Turkish forces to dominate Hejaz after weakening the Hejaz Arabs and then eliminate Sharif Haidar and Jaafar, as they did with Sayyid Abdul Karim Qasim Al-Khalili and Sayyid Al-Zahrawi (Al-Manar, 1916d: 151).

It becomes clear from Rida's account that the Ottoman government sought to exploit Sharif Haidar and his brother Sharif Jaafar by lavishing them with positions and money to take over some Hejaz tribes to the Turkish side. Rida warned that this would ultimately lead to their downfall after the suppression of Sharif Hussein's revolt. Global and Arab press coverage of Sharif Hussein's revolution and its victories over the Unionists and Turks pushed the Turkish government to recognize Sharif Hussein's revolution. However, they began to view it through a political lens, shifting from media blackouts to political and military defamations, aiming to tarnish the revolution and Sharif Hussein's image among the Turkish public and supporters of the Committee of Union and Progress. Turkish newspapers began issuing statements to demean the revolution and belittle it. The Egyptian newspaper *Al-Muqattam* reported what Turkish newspapers had to talk on the matter. On July 26, the Turkish newspaper Tanin published an editorial expressing the Turkish government's perspective on the events of the Hejaz revolt and downplaying its significance. A Turkish writer in Tanin stated that these disturbances and unrest were due to the ambitions of the former Emir Hussein Pasha and that it had nothing to do with Hejaz or Islam, predicting that his fate would be an utter failure, like other adventurers throughout the six-century history of the Ottoman state (Al-Muqattam, 1916m: 1).

The Turkish newspaper tried to tarnish the image of Sharif Hussein, accusing him of selling himself for British gold, which aimed to discord between the Ottoman Empire and its Arab and Muslim subjects. According to the newspaper, the British exploited Sharif Hussein to give their ambitions an Islamic veneer. The paper stated that the enemies of the state, mainly the English, who were enemies of Islam, orchestrated the conspiracy using glittering gold. They will try to present this issue as an Arab matter, making it seem like an Islamic issue, while in reality, it is a personal crime committed by former Prince Hussein Pasha.

Furthermore, the Turkish newspaper *Tasvir-i Efkâr* published an article titled "Corruption in Mecca," commenting on the Turkish Interior Minister's statement on 27th July 1916, describing these disturbances as the corruption of the Amir of Mecca and distancing the Hejaz from the Turkish government (Al-Muqattam, 1916m: 1). For several months, the Turkish press depicted Sharif Hussein's movement as an individual rebellion driven by personal motives and British instigation, claiming it to be a British conspiracy. They asserted that it would be quelled with the help of the Hejazi people and their tribes, who remained loyal to the

caliphate and the Prophet's directives regarding the sacred duty of jihad (Burj, 1989: 165).

6. Conclusion

6.1. Results

1) Ottoman policies toward the Arabs ultimately led to the emergence of a generation of Arabs dissatisfied with Turkish Ottoman rule. Sharif Hussein bin Ali and his sons from the Hashemite family exemplified this. Consequently, the Great Arab Revolt and the liberation of the Levant from Turkish-German forces, followed by the declaration of the Arab government there, were reactions to the unjust Ottoman policies toward the Arabs.

2) The Ottoman government sometimes tried to deceive Turkish public opinion by downplaying the Arab Revolt as a minor rebellion that the Ottoman forces could easily control. At other times, they used media blackout tactics by not publishing reports on the clashes between the Arabs and Turkey and Germany as ally.

3) Germany, Turkey's strong ally, tried to assist in suppressing the revolt and defeating the Arabs due to Turkey's strong desire to move toward the east and implement its plan to control the countries under Ottoman rule. However, the defeat of Turkish forces by the Arabs eventually led Germany to abandon its ally, especially after realizing the unlimited military support Britain provided to the Arabs in their wars with Ottoman Turkey.

4) The study also revealed that Britain aimed to control the Arab countries in the eastern Arab world and divide them according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. However, it found the ambitions of Sharif Hussein bin Ali and his sons to be obstacles to achieving his goals, leading to his dismissal and exile from the Arab countries.

6.2. Comparison with Other Studies

A comparison of this study with many other studies that addressed the Great Arab Revolt in the Hejaz reveals that this study is new in its subject for the following reasons:

1) It appears that this study is new in its subject because most studies that have addressed the history of the Great Arab Revolt have focused only on its causes, events, outcomes, and Arab and British reactions, without mentioning the opposing stance of the German-Ottoman alliance.

2) This study relied on analyzing what was mentioned in Egyptian newspapers as a primary source, such as *Al-Ahram*, *Al-Mokattam*, *Al-Masr*, and *Al-Manar*, whereas other studies did not rely on the Egyptian press as a source, in addition to some British reports.

6.3. Recommendations and Future Research

The study recommends the need for more Studies about

1) The impact of the Great Arab Revolt on German-Turkish relations, especially following the failure of their alliance to quell the revolt.

2) The influence of the Great Arab Revolt on nationalist liberation movements in the remaining countries of the Arab East.

3) The effect of the German-Turkish alliance against the Arabs on German-Arab relations and their political presence and role in the Arab East during the first half of the twentieth century.

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